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The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case 
THE TREASON CLAUSE AND THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE 
“Civis Romanus sum”1 
INTRODUCTION 
During March 2013, a legal question dominated the U.S. 
news cycle: “Does the President have the authority to use a 
weaponized drone to kill an American not engaged in combat 
on American soil?” 2  This inquiry represents the paramount 
question in American constitutional balancing: the total 
deprivation of a citizen’s life, liberty, and property3 by secret, 
 
 1 In Rome, a citizen accused of any crime would need merely utter “civis 
Romanus sum,” “I am a Roman citizen,” to avoid judicial process as a non-citizen. See 
Acts 22, 27 (King James). While preaching in Damascus, the apostle Paul avoids being 
immediately whipped by a centurion for zealous demagoguery by asserting his 
citizenship and, in subsequent chapters, is afforded appellate process—all the way to 
Caesar. Id. at 22-28. 
 2 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Attorney General to Sen. Rand Paul (Mar. 7, 
2013) [hereinafter March 7 Holder Letter], reprinted in Daniel Hapler, Holder’s Letter 
to Rand Paul, WKLY. STANDARD (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.weeklystandard.com/ 
blogs/holders-letter-rand-paul-no-us-cant-use-drone-kill-citizen-not-engaged-combat-
us-soil_706587.html. 
 3 For example, the Government handling of Anwar al-Aulaqi resulted in the 
deprivation of: his life, by virtue of his death by droning; his liberty, e.g., by the 
restriction on his right to travel; and his property, by the subjection of his assets to 
total seizure and forfeiture (and to the disinherision of his heir working a prohibited 
corruption of blood). Mark Mazzetti et al., Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki 
in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011) (describing al-Aulaqi’s droning by U.S. order and 
process), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-
awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html?pagewanted=all; see infra Part V.A.2.b (discussing the 
restrictions on liberty of movement by virtue of governmental lethal targeting in Yemen); 
Designation of ANWAR AL-AULAQI Pursuant to Executive Order 13224 and the Global 
Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, 75 Fed. Reg. 43233-01 (July 23, 2010) 
[hereinafter al-Aulaqi Designation]; infra Parts I.A.3 & IV.B (discussing the constitutional 
guarantee that a traitor’s forfeited assets will go to the traitor’s heirs). 
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unreviewable executive order4 weighted against the presidential 
duty and power to defend the people from warlike assault.5 In 
responding to this question, Attorney General Eric Holder denied 
that the President had this authority to kill Americans without 
process, but his response contained the seemingly innocuous 
qualifier that “[the American must] not [be] engaged in 
combat.”6 Moreover, on March 4, 2013, Holder affirmed that in 
response to circumstances like the Pearl Harbor or September 
11 attacks, the President may “authorize lethal force, such as a 
drone strike, against a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil, and without 
trial.”7 The distinction between when the President may and 
may not so deprive a citizen’s liberty appears to hinge upon 
whether the citizen is conducting a war or engaging in combat 
against the United States. 
While drawing this important distinction, Holder likely 
was cognizant of the favorable case law on the federal power to 
conduct drone strikes—case law that would almost 
undoubtedly permit the unreviewable, executively ordered 
droning of CIA designated terrorist suspects on U.S. soil without 
trial, 8  and that absolutely permits doing so on foreign soil. 9 
Federal case law defines terrorist acts by enemy combatants as 
“levying war [against the United States],”10  and declares the 
lethal targeting of terrorist subjects a nonjusticiable political 
 
 4 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46-47 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that the 
lethal targeting of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi is a nonjusticiable political question). 
 5 U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 8; 3 (“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will 
faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of 
my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States,” and 
respectively, “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”). 
 6 March 7 Holder Letter, supra note 2. 
 7 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Attorney General to Sen. Rand Paul (Mar. 4, 
2013), available at http://www.paul.senate.gov/files/documents/BrennanHolderResponse.pdf. 
 8 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47 (applying the political question 
doctrine); John C. Dehn & Kevin John Heller, Debate, Targeted Killing: The Case of 
Anwar al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 175, 185-87 (2011), available at 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/TargetedKilling.pdf. 
 9 See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47. 
 10 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 149-60 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1094 (2000); accord United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 
1117 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2444 (2012); United States v. Awadallah, 
349 F.3d 42, 59 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied; Awadallah v. United States, 543 U.S. 1056 
(2005) (“The particular governmental interests at stake therefore were the indictment 
and successful prosecution of terrorists whose attack, if committed by a sovereign, 
would have been tantamount to war, and the discovery of the conspirators’ means, 
contacts, and operations in order to forestall future attacks”); United States v. 
Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987). 
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question.11 The legal basis for this power was recently affirmed 
in the 2010 case al-Aulaqi v. Obama.12 
On September 30, 2011, Anwar al-Aulaqi13 was struck 
“by ‘a barrage of Hellfire missiles’ fired from a [predator] 
drone.”14 At the time, he was traveling by car on a deserted 
Yemeni highway with fellow U.S. citizen, and “proud” traitor, 
Samir Khan.15 The killing followed a fact-finding and a legal 
determination by the CIA that al-Aulaqi should die.16 No U.S. 
court ever found al-Aulaqi guilty of any violent crime.17 
Nevertheless, the President ordered al-Aulaqi’s killing18 
because he was the “leader of external operations” in the 
terrorist organization al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 
al-Qaeda’s “most active operational affiliate.”19 Al-Aulaqi’s killing 
prompted his family 20  to bring two federal lawsuits as 
representatives, al-Aulaqi v. Obama and al-Aulaqi v. 
 
 11 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47 (applying the political question doctrine). 
 12 Id. at 1. 
 13 Anwar’s last name has been spelled many ways, most commonly “al-
Awlaki,” “Awlaki,” “al-Awlaqi,” or “al-Aulaki.” Mazzetti et al., supra note 3 (quoting 
Samir Khan). This note uses “al-Aulaqi” because this is how the family and the District 
Court for the District of Columbia spells the name. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1; Complaint at ¶ 9, Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 1:10-cv-01469) [hereinafter Al-
Aulaqi Complaint]. 
 14 Mark V. Vlasic, Assassination & Targeted Killing—A Historical and Post-
Bin Laden Legal Analysis, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 259, 330 (2011) (citing Mazzetti et al., 
supra note 3). 
 15 Mazzetti et al., supra note 3 (quoting Samir Khan). 
 16 Benjamin McKlevey, Note, Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of 
Suspected Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power, 44 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1353, 1358-59 (2011) (describing briefly the CIA process for approving 
kill list status). See generally Tara McKlevey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK, 
Feb. 21, 2011, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/02/13/inside-
the-killing-machine.html. 
 17 See infra note 97 and accompanying text (describing the entirety of al-
Aulaqi’s criminal record). 
 18 Islamist Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in Yemen, B.B.C. NEWS (Sept. 30, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15121879; see also McKlevey, Due 
Process Rights, supra note 16, at 1358 (noting the National Security Council’s approval 
of the use of lethal force). 
 19 Mazzetti et al., supra note 3 (“‘The death of Awlaki is a major blow to Al 
Qaeda’s most active operational affiliate . . . [al-Aulaqi took] the lead role in planning 
and directing the efforts to murder innocent Americans.’” (quoting Barak Obama, 
President, Remarks at the Swearing-In Ceremony for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Gen. Martin E. Dempsey (Sept. 30, 2011))). 
 20 These lawsuits were filed by family members purporting to be the 
representatives of the individuals allegedly placed on the CIA’s kill list, see Al-Aulaqi 
Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶ 9 (asserting third party standing); however, the 
question of third-party standing to bring such challenges, like the merits of the 
challenge, remains open. Complaint at ¶¶ 10, 41-3, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 1:12-cv-
01192-RMC (D.C. Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Panetta Complaint]. The implications of 
third-party standing are discussed infra at Part IV.B. 
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Panetta.21 The first of these suits, al-Aulaqi v. Obama, sought 
to enjoin the CIA from placing al-Aulaqi on a “kill list[ ].”22 The 
suit posed novel questions regarding the constitutionality of 
using such force against U.S. citizens overseas.23 Al-Aulaqi v. 
Panetta has not yet been resolved. Many scholars have 
questioned the Executive’s unilateral—and apparently 
unreviewable—power to order the targeted killing of citizens 
who have not been found guilty of any crime by any U.S. court.24 
Fear over the abuse of government power to execute 
citizens for capital offenses motivated the inclusion of the 
Treason Clause in the Constitution: 
 
 21 See generally, e.g., Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1; Panetta Complaint, supra note 20. 
 22 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 11. 
 23 See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 8 (“Stark, and perplexing, questions 
readily come to mind, including the following: How is it that judicial approval is 
required when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for electronic 
surveillance, but that, according to defendants, judicial scrutiny is prohibited when the 
United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for death?”); see also N.Y. Times 
Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he 
Government . . . cannot be compelled by this court of law to explain . . . the reasons 
why its actions do not violate the Constitution and laws of the United States. The 
Alice-in-Wonderland nature of this pronouncement is not lost on me; but after careful 
and extensive consideration, I find myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in which I 
cannot solve a problem because of contradictory constraints and rules—a veritable 
Catch-22. I can find no way around the thicket of laws and precedents that effectively 
allow the Executive Branch . . . to proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that 
seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the 
reasons for its conclusion a secret.”).  
 24 See generally, e.g., Ryan Patrick Alford, The Rule of Law at the Crossroads: 
Consequences of Targeted Killing of Citizens, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2011) 
(discussing the parallels between medieval law and modern treason law); Carlton F.W. 
Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant 
Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863 (2006) (arguing that the Treason Clause provides for 
criminal process of how U.S. citizen-enemy combatants should be treated); Michael 
Ramsey, Meet the New Boss, Continuity in Presidential War Powers, 35 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 863 (2012) (arguing that the Constitution requires that persons in al-
Aulaqi’s situation be tried for Treason under Article III); Philip Dore, Comment, 
Greenlighting American Citizens: Proceed With Caution, 72 LA. L. REV. 255, 257 (2011) 
(arguing that “the foreign murder statute prohibits the targeted killing of Anwar al-
Awlaki.”); Mike Dreyfuss, Note, My Fellow Americans, We Are Going to Kill You: The 
Legality of Targeting and Killing U.S. Citizens Abroad, 65 VAND. L. REV. 249, 273 
(2012) (arguing that Procedural Due Process demands only that a person in al-Aulaqi’s 
situation receives notice, and an opportunity to be heard if that person surrenders to 
authorities); Abraham U. Kannof, Comment, Dueling Nationalities: Dual Citizenship, 
Dominant and Effective Nationality, And The Case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, 25 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 1371, 1415 (2011) (arguing that al-Aulaqi should not be treated as a U.S. 
citizen for constitutional purposes, but a Yemeni citizen, and afforded the attendant 
protections); Lindsay Kwoka, Comment, Trial By Sniper: The Legality of Targeted 
Killing In the War on Terror, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 301 (2011) (arguing that under the 
Mathews test and Hamdi, there is a minimum Fifth Amendment Due Process right to 
appear before a neutral decision-maker); McKlevey, supra note 16 (arguing that under 
the Mathews test and Hamdi, the current policy regarding targeted killing without 
notice and an opportunity to be heard violates minimum due process rights). 
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Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War 
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and 
Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the 
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession 
in open Court. The Congress shall have Power to declare the 
Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work 
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the 
Person attainted.25 
Enshrined in the Constitution is a single, necessary and 
sufficient definition of what acts constitute treason. The word 
“traitor” is a powerful epithet that conjures images of historic 
villains like Benedict Arnold, Ephialtes,26 or Judas Iscariot. It is 
this animus—and the historically demonstrable potential for 
tyrannical abuse of a government’s power to punish treacherous 
wrongdoers27—that galvanized the Founding Fathers to include 
the “fundamentally restrictive” Treason Clause28 and to tout it 
as an instrument of liberty.29 
It is, however, unclear precisely what the Treason Clause 
demands in a situation like al-Aulaqi’s.30 All other things equal, 
 
 25 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
 26 Ephialtes showed the Persians the path to route the Spartans at 
Thermopylae. HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES, bk. 7, ch. 213, § 1 (John Marincola, ed., 
Aubrey De Selincourt, trans., Penguin ed., 1996). 
 27 Larson, supra note 24 at 873 (quoting James Wilson) (“This punishment 
[execution], and the description of this crime, are the great sources of danger and 
persecution, on the part of government, against the citizen. Crimes against the state! 
and against the officers of the state! History informs us that more wrong may be done 
on this subject than on any other whatsoever.”); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF 
TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES: COLLECTED ESSAYS, 143 (Stanley I. Kitler, ed., 1971) 
(quoting Rufus King). As to animus, one merely needs to look at the statute to 
understand the severity society attaches to this crime. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012) 
(codifying that traitors “shall suffer death”). 
 28 HURST, supra note 27, at 132. 
 29 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), reprinted in PENN 
STATE, Electronic Classics Series, The Federalist Papers (2001) (“As treason may be 
committed against the United States, the authority of the United States ought to be 
enabled to punish it. But as new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great 
engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free government, have 
usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other, the convention have, with 
great judgment, opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a constitutional 
definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary for conviction of it, and restraining 
the Congress, even in punishing it, from extending the consequences of guilt beyond 
the person of its author.”). 
 30 Compare, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 273 (“[G]uarantee of a jury trial 
is a protection available if the designated individual decides to avail himself of it. With 
regard to targeted killings, the Constitution, however, does not demand that a person 
who is a military threat to the United States remain at large because he is good at 
avoiding arrest.”), with Ramsey, supra note 24 at 869-70 (“Absent exigent 
circumstances, the Constitution provides a specific way for acting against U.S. 
citizens . . . [like al-Aulaqi]: the Treason Clause.”), and Larson, supra note 24 (arguing 
that the Treason Clause provides for criminal process of how U.S. citizen-enemy 
combatants should be treated). 
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the Constitution discriminates between citizens and non-
citizens who levy war against the United States31 by affording 
citizens additional procedural protections beyond, and, as a 
constitutional due process constraint, preceding32 what the Fifth 
Amendment provides.33 Al-Aulaqi engaged in terrorist activities, 
but he was also a citizen—a citizen-terrorist.34 It is possible, 
therefore, that his actions constituted treason. It is also possible 
that his actions merely constituted speech protected by the First 
Amendment, as it is curious how a supporter of George W. 
Bush—who addressed a Pentagon luncheon for the Department 
of Defense in February 2002—could become the global leader of 
al Qaeda’s newest form by 2010.35 However, this note presumes 
all facts favorable to the government, in an attempt to isolate 
the issues of law from issues of fact.  
Commentators have discussed the broad Treason Clause 
claim generated by the unique circumstances of the al-Aulaqi 
situation: the restrictive intent behind the Treason Clause 
means it is constitutionally appropriate to treat citizen-
terrorists as traitors.36  However, by broadly focusing on the 
 
 31 It is a settled matter of constitutional law that the Treason Clause applies 
only persons owing allegiance, a category that includes every U.S. citizen and those 
non-citizens who owe allegiance. See infra note 125. 
 32 Cf. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942) (per curiam) (finding Article III 
protections not “enlarge[d]” by additional amendments to the Constitution). 
 33 Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (providing specifically for the unique 
requirement of two witnesses to the same overt acts as a procedural protection), with 
id. at amend. V (providing for “due process” in all other crimes). 
 34 The use of “citizen-terrorist” throughout this note serves as shorthand for 
U.S. citizens conducting politically or religiously motivated war against the United 
States in connection with a terrorist organization. In the most convenient definition, 
citizen-terrorists are the class of people affected by the al-Aulaqi case based on 
factually similar positioning. See generally Richard H. Fallon, As-Applied and Facial 
Challenges and Third Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000); id. at 1368 (“as-
applied challenges reflect entrenched though often unarticulated presuppositions that 
the full meaning of a statute frequently is not obvious on the occasion of its first 
application, but can be left to emerge through case-by-case specification . . . .”). Portions 
of those notes may arguably apply to non-citizens owing allegiance, and indeed the 
arguments that relate solely to the Treason Clause indubitably would. This note, 
however, does not explore the effect of the Equal Protection Clause in the context a 
non-citizen-terrorists owing allegiance. 
 35  JEREMY SCAHILL, DIRTY WARS: THE WORLD IS A BATTLEFIELD 36, 45 (Nation 
Books, 2013). For a general description of the narrative were al-Aulaqi was hounded by the 
government—unfairly and in violation of his rights—into finally fighting against his 
country, see generally id. at chs. 2, 5, 18, 23, 33, 34, 37, 38, 44, 50, 55, 57. 
 36 Emily C. Kendall, Guy Fawkes’s Dangerous Remedy: The 
Unconstitutionality of Government-Ordered Assassination Against U.S. Citizens and Its 
Implications For Due Process in America, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1121, 1136 (2012) 
(arguing that “[the] Treason Clause is the constitutionally appropriate remedy for 
bringing domestic terrorists to justice”); see also, e.g., Larson, supra note 24, at 863 
(“The Article also argues that many terrorist actions are appropriately punished as 
treason, either as acts of levying war against the United States or of adhering to their 
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general restrictive intention, this scholarship overlooks the 
more basic threshold question: is it even constitutionally 
permissible for the Government to treat citizen-terrorists 
differently than traitors? 
Considering the al-Aulaqi killing in conjunction with a 
reading of either the Treason Clause or, in most cases, the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes 
clear that the answer to this question is no.37 The Supreme 
Court has consistently held that the prosecution of criminals 
without the procedural and substantive protections of the 
Treason Clause under a crime that is substantively treason, 
but differently named, is an unconstitutional prosecution for a 
constructive treason offense.38 Similarly, in Skinner v. Oklahoma 
ex rel. Williamson, the Supreme Court held that under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Government may not “lay[ ]  an unequal hand” on criminals who 
have committed “intrinsically the same . . . offense.”39 In that case, 
the Court considered a lesser right than the right to life, the 
right to reproduce.40 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 41  a plurality of the Supreme 
Court addressed the liberty of Guantanamo detainees and held 
that citizen-terrorists (even those termed enemy combatants in 
the War on Terror) are entitled to due process. The actions 
considered by the Supreme Court, if committed by citizens, 
would be punishable as treason.42 Thus, there are twin perils 
confronting any court adjudicating a modern terrorism case 
where the defendant is a U.S. citizen. First, a court must avoid 
the temptation to draw immaterial distinctions between the 
constitutional definition of treason and modern statutes 
 
enemies. Rather than representing a fundamental departure from the ordinary 
criminal law paradigm, terrorist actions fit comfortably within it.”); Benjamin A. Lewis, 
An Old Means To A Different End: The War On Terror, American Citizens . . . and the 
Treason Clause, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1215 (2006); Ramsey, supra note 24. 
 37 For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the Government 
gave al-Aulaqi all process due under the law for similarly situated non-citizen terrorist 
organization operatives. Those due process claims have been discussed by many 
commentators, see supra note 24. This discussion is bracketing off those claims to focus on 
other arguments that have not been given their due examination. The issue taken here is 
not with treating terrorists in general this way, but treating in this way citizen-terrorists. 
 38 See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945) (“[The Court does 
not] . . . intimate that Congress could dispense with the two-witness rule merely by 
giving the same offense [treason] another name.”); see infra Part I.A (describing the 
contours of this rule and its jurisprudential history in detail).  
 39 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (Douglas, J.).  
 40 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536. 
 41 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (O’Connor, J.) (plurality opinion). 
 42 See infra Part III.C. 
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criminalizing terrorism or else it risks ignoring the prohibition 
against prosecuting constructive treasons. Then, it must take 
care to avoid the second peril of ensuring that any differential 
treatment of a citizen-terrorist and a traitor does not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause. Courts have yet to confront the 
second peril because every court to consider the interplay 
between the Treason Clause and citizen-terrorists to date has 
faltered at the first peril. Therefore, and based on citizenship 
alone, the execution of a U.S. citizen without judicial process—
even for committing terrorist acts—violates the prohibitions of 
both the Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. 
In Part I, this note briefly summarizes jurisprudence 
surrounding the two constitutional provisions relevant to the 
issues raised by al-Aulaqi: the Treason Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause. Part II reviews the relevant facts of the al-
Aulaqi case. Part III examines the elements of the crimes of 
treason by levying war and terrorism, and establishes that 
when committed by a citizen, treason by levying war and 
terrorism are essentially the same offense with only immaterial 
and legally inconsequential variances. In Part IV, this note 
discusses the first peril of al-Aulaqi: that the law of treason 
precludes the Government from charging citizens with terrorism 
offenses that are not materially different from treason, yet fails 
to provide the constitutional protections afforded to traitors. 
Part V discusses the second peril: that denying citizen-
terrorists the same constitutional protections as traitors 
violates the Equal Protection Clause 43  and would therefore 
subject the Government’s actions in al-Aulaqi’s case to strict 
scrutiny review.44 Finally, this note concludes that the Treason 
Clause precludes the Executive from issuing kill orders against 
citizen-terrorists without being processed by an Article III 
court. It further suggests a specific remedy. 
 
 43 See infra Part V.A. 
 44 See infra Part V.B. 
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I. TREASON AND EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Law of Treason 
1. The Treason Clause and the Rule Against 
Constructive Treasons 
American treason law borrows heavily from English 
treason law, as evinced by the influence of the then-prevailing 
English treason statute 45  upon the constitutional drafters. 46 
Before the Statute of Edward III codified a restrictive definition 
of treason, the English courts had the power to create what 
James Madison called a “new-fangled and artificial treason[ ] .”47 
Madison was referring to an English court’s power to invent a 
constructive treason by expanding the common law definition 
of treason to accommodate novel facts.48 That is to say, the 
courts had the power to declare acts treasonable that had never 
been so before.49 
Madison further described constructive treasons as “the 
great engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of 
free government, have usually wreaked their alternate 
malignity on each other.”50 In Revolutionary Era England, this 
malignity typically took the form of public hanging, drawing, 
and quartering. 51  Not surprisingly, the abusive use of 
constructive treason became disfavored in England; and the 
Statute of Edward III altered the law, codifying the definition 
of treason and requiring that novel treason cases must go 
before Parliament, instead of the courts.52 
 
 45 Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2. 
 46 Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 67 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“The most relevant source of materials for interpretation of the [T]reason [C]lause of 
the Constitution is the statute of 25 Edw. III, Stat. 5, ch. 2 (1351) and the construction 
which was given it.”); HURST, supra note 27 at 138-40; Larson, supra note 24, at 870 
(“No provision of the Constitution is as rooted in English legal history as the Treason 
Clause. It would likely surprise most Americans to learn that a portion of the United 
States Constitution is taken almost verbatim from an English statute [25 Edw. 3 c. 2] 
enacted when Geoffrey Chaucer was eight years old. The phrases ‘levying war’ and 
‘adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort’ in the Treason Clause come 
directly from the treason statute of 25 Edward III, enacted in 1351.”). 
 47 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 29; see also HURST, supra note 27, at 143. 
 48 HURST, supra note 27, at 139. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 29. 
 51 Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2; United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 
112 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *92). 
 52 HURST, supra note 27, at 139. 
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While the Statute of Edward III was certainly an 
improvement over the use of constructive treasons by a 
handpicked judiciary serving at the pleasure of the King,53 the 
Founding Fathers thought that this was not enough protection 
for treason defendants. Mindful of their status as traitors while 
fighting the rule of England,54 they sought to eliminate the 
potential for abusive prosecution of treason against groups 
with public grievances by including systemic, constitutional 
restrictions.55 First they created a fixed, restrictive definition of 
treason by limiting it to the two offenses enumerated in the 
Constitution—levying war and adhering to the enemy. 56 
Second, they deliberately moved the Treason Clause to its final 
position in Article III from its draft position in Article I so that 
the Judiciary would “administer the clause” and Congress would 
have no power with respect to the scope of the offense.57 Third, 
they established an evidentiary requirement that two witnesses 
testify to the same overt treasonous act, which further reflected 
the “fundamentally restrictive attitude” behind the Drafters’ 
inclusion of the Clause.58  Finally, regarding the scope of the 
punishment, corruption of blood,59 the forfeiture of the convicted 
traitor’s estate and disinheritance of successors, 60  were 
prohibited entirely. In the broadest sense, the Drafters sought to 
disable the Government from either amending the definition of 
treason, or from punishing traitors without first satisfying a 
high burden of proof.61 
 
 53 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 439 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “Curia Regis,” the 
King’s court of appeals); see also Alford, supra note 24, at 1205-06, 1215. 
 54 United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (“[T]hey themselves were 
traitors in the eyes of England.”), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908; N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 55 Rodriguez, 803 F.2d at 320 (“The reason for the restrictive definition is 
apparent from the historical backdrop of the treason clause. The framers of the 
Constitution were reluctant to facilitate such prosecutions because they were well 
aware of abuses . . . .”). 
 56 The language in the Treason Clause intentionally reflects that of the 
prevailing English treason statute, the Statute of Edward III, in order to limit the 
definition of the crime to the “old terms.” HURST, supra note 27, at 131; see also Jon 
Roland, Hurst’s Law of Treason, 35 UWLA L. REV. 297, 297-98 (2003). 
 57 HURST, supra note 27, at 139. 
 58 Id., at 132. 
 59 “[A] ‘corruption of blood’ is the perpetual forfeiture of the convicted person’s 
estate to the disinheritance of his or her heirs or children.” See infra note 77 and 
accompanying text. 
 60 See infra note 77. 
 61 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (requiring two witnesses to the same overt act); 
HURST, supra note 27, at 130 (“At one stroke, the basis of the restrictive policy had 
been laid: all authority is taken from any other agency to define the extent of the 
crime . . . .”). 
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Interpreting the Clause with an eye toward its 
restrictive nature, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged in Ex 
parte Bollman that: 
To prevent the possibility of those calamities . . . that great 
fundamental law which defines and limits the various departments 
of our government has given a rule on the subject both to the 
legislature and the courts of America, which neither can be permitted 
to transcend. 
Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war 
against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and 
comfort.62 
Accordingly, the Court created a doctrinal rule to reflect 
the comprehensive yet precisely circumscribed treason 
definition enshrined in the Constitution: from Bollman in 1807 
to Cramer v. United States in 1947, the Court has consistently 
held that treason may not be extended beyond its constitutional 
definition.63 By virtue of this rule against constructive treasons, 
merely immaterial variations in the elements of treason that 
leave the gravamen of the offense intact will not create a 
separate offense which avoids bringing the additional 
procedural protections of the Treason Clause into play.64 
2. Separation of Powers: The State’s Role in Crimes 
against the State 
Although the relocation of the Treason Clause from 
Article I to Article III was intended to constrain the legislature, 
“The treason clause[ ]  [is] clearly [a] limitation[ ]  upon all the 
agencies of government, instead of . . . the legislative branch 
 
 62 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125-26 (1807) (emphasis added) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art III, § 3) (holding that conspiracy to levy war is a separate 
offense from that of treason by levying war, and is not subject to the constitutional 
restrictions of Article III); see also infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 63 Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 127 (“[T]he crime of treason should not be 
extended by construction to doubtful cases; and that crimes not clearly within the 
constitutional definition, should receive such punishment as the legislature in its 
wisdom may provide.”); see also id. at 118 (“The intention of having a constitutional 
definition of the crime, was to put it out of the power of congress to invent treasons.”); 
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945) (“[The Court does not] . . . intimate that 
Congress could dispense with the two-witness rule merely by giving the same offense 
[treason] another name.”); HURST, supra note 27, at 239 (stating that the Drafters 
“[A]cknowledg[ed] that the [T]reason [C]lause . . . set the exclusive definitions of 
treason; Congress might not vary the elements of treason or escape the substantive 
constitutional definition . . . by attaching a different label to [treason].”). 
 64 See supra note 63. 
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only.” 65  Congress only has the power to prescribe a limited 
punishment and has no power to redefine treason as such or to 
expand that category of behavior that falls within the ambit of 
“treason.” 66  The Judiciary is given the responsibility to 
administer the law of treason, yet cannot expand the definition 
of treason.67 The Executive has no express grant of responsibility 
with respect to treason, but one may reasonably presume that 
the President’s Article II “take care” powers68 would encompass, 
for example, the incidental role of serving as prosecutor, 
custodian, or executioner. The Constitution’s lack of any 
express grant should be read as giving the President the least 
authority in the administration of treason.69 
Further, in Ex parte Garland, the Supreme Court read 
the prohibition against corruptions of blood as a constitutional 
charge to the Judiciary: “[T]herefore, to still further guard 
against this odious form of punishment, it is provided, in 
section three of article iii, concerning the judiciary [that 
Congress may not work a corruption of blood] . . . .” 70  This 
reading by the Court—that the placement of the Treason 
Clause and its prohibition on corruptions of blood in Article III 
charges the Judiciary to guard against its use—further bolsters 
the conclusion that the placement of treason within Article III 
textually commits the role of administering treason law to the 
Judiciary.71 This reading of Article III as a separation of powers 
regarding the administration of treason law was most recently 
 
 65 HURST, supra note 27, at 165; see also Alford, supra note 24, at 1215; infra 
Part V.A. 
 66 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
 67 HURST, supra note 27, at 165. 
 68 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 69 See Alford, supra note 24, at 1215 (“The fact that the Constitution 
prohibits bills of attainder and not royal proclamations of attainder (by then long 
obsolete), should not be taken as evidence that the Framers endorsed the idea ex 
silentio that the president should have the power of judging [citizens guilty of 
treason]—especially since Hamilton felt that this would mean that there would be ‘no 
liberty.’ This absence merely indicated that in 1787 this idea had already been 
expressly rejected. By then it was the consensus position that the common law could 
not countenance such an anti-constitutionalist idea, and the idea was hardly worth 
mentioning.”); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President acts in absence of [ ]  a . . . denial of 
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of 
twilight in which he and . . . [another branch] may have concurrent authority, or in 
which its distribution is uncertain.”). 
 70 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 387 (1867) (Field, J.) (emphasis added). 
 71 See supra Part I.A.2. 
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affirmed in the 2013 case New York Times Co. v. U.S. 
Department of Justice.72 
3. The Evidentiary Requirement and the Protection 
against “Corruptions of Blood” 
The Treason Clause contains a stringent, disjunctive 
evidentiary requirement that is clear in its meaning—either 
the Government must produce two witnesses to the same overt 
act of treason, or the traitor must confess in open court.73 The 
strict requirement of two witnesses to the same overt act is 
unique to American treason jurisprudence.74 No federal defendant 
has exercised the open confession option, but courts likely will 
interpret it by its plain meaning.75 
 
 72 915 F. Supp. 2d at 523 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) and citing Larson, supra note 24 (internal citations 
omitted)) (“Interestingly, the Treason Clause appears in the Article of the Constitution 
concerning the Judiciary—not in Article 2, which defines the powers of the Executive 
Branch. This suggests that the Founders contemplated that traitors would be dealt 
with by the courts of law, not by unilateral action of the Executive. As no less a 
constitutional authority than Justice Antonin Scalia noted, in his dissenting opinion in 
Hamdi, ‘Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our 
constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court for treason or some 
other crime.’”). For a discussion of how this separation of powers principle affects 
Political Question Doctrine analysis, see infra Part IV.D. 
 73 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. Notably, nowhere in the text of the Treason 
Clause is there a guarantee of trial and, in fact, such a blanket requirement may 
seriously hinder the President’s ability to act in self-defense. The drafters did, however, 
include an exhaustive enumeration of the specific procedural protections afforded to 
traitors. Under the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of construction, this 
would mean that the Treason Clause then excludes the specific protection of a jury trial 
for traitors. But see Ramsey, supra note 24, at 869-70 (citations omitted) (“The Treason 
Clause requires that they be brought to trial under specific conditions . . . ”). 
Conversely, under noscitur a sociis (it will be known by the company it keeps), the 
drafters at the time were also likely cognizant of the immediately preceding text in 
Article III, Section ii, providing that “The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury.” 
However, this right clearly would apply to treason for reasons discussed, infra, Part 
V.A.2.a. For a thorough discussion of the right to a jury trial in a civilian jurisdiction 
for traitors, see Larson, supra note 24. Larson argues very convincingly that “[u]nder 
the constitutional law of treason, any person who is potentially subject to an American 
treason prosecution must be tried in a civilian court and may not be detained by the 
military as an enemy combatant or subjected to military tribunals.” Id. at 867. 
 74 Originally, in the 1695 Statute of William III, The Treason Act 1695, 7 & 8 
Will. 3, c. 3., English law required that there be two witnesses to the crime of treason, 
but not to the same overt act. The Founding Fathers, presumably finding this to be 
insufficient, made the requirement stricter in American law. This particular 
requirement has proven to be difficult for prosecutors. For example, in the trial of 
Aaron Burr, Burr was acquitted based on the fact that there were no two witnesses to 
the same overt act of treason by levying war. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2, 13-15 
(Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va., 1807) (No. 14692a); United States v. Burr, 25 F. 
Cas. 55, 181 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va., 1807) (No. 14693). 
 75 See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 426, 534 (2004) (“It is well established 
that when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least 
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The Treason Clause also creates a unique protection for 
property interests. A traitor’s assets may only be subjected to 
temporary forfeiture, not perpetual forfeiture: “[N]o Attainder 
of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except 
during the Life of the Person attainted.”76 In the context of 
treason, a “corruption of blood” is the perpetual forfeiture of the 
convicted person’s estate to the disinheritance of his or her 
heirs or children. 77  Corruptions of blood were particularly 
disfavored, both by the drafters of the Constitution78 and in 
England at the time that Blackstone wrote his Commentaries.79 
Many state constitutions also showed an express disfavor for 
corruptions of blood.80 
During the Reconstruction Era, the Supreme Court 
faced several challenges relating to disposition of 
government-confiscated Confederate property.81 In Wallach v. 
Van Riswick, 82  the Court interpreted the 1862 Confiscation 
Act. 83  The Court discussed the meaning of the Act and its 
relation to the Article III bar on perpetual forfeitures: “[B]oth 
 
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to 
its terms.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 
470, 485 (1917) (Day, J.) (“Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one 
meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid 
doubtful meanings need no discussion.”); see also Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 
39, 44, 60-61, 65-66 (1945) (giving dicta about the two-witness rule). 
 76 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
 77 See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 387 (1866); see also BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 397 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “corruption of blood” as “[a] defunct 
doctrine, now considered unconstitutional, under which a person loses the ability to 
inherit or pass property as a result of an attainder . . . .”). 
 78 Max Stier, Note, Corruption of Blood and Equal Protection: Why the Sins of 
the Parents Should Not Matter, 44 STAN. L. REV. 727, 730-31 (1992). The reasons for 
the disfavor are clear: it harms innocent children. Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 
210 (1876) (“What was intended by the constitutional provision [The Treason Clause] is 
free from doubt. In England, attainders of treason worked corruption of blood and 
perpetual forfeiture of the estate of the person attainted, to the disinherison of his 
heirs, or of those who would otherwise be his heirs. Thus innocent children were made 
to suffer because of the offence of their ancestor. When the Federal Constitution was 
framed, this was felt to be a great hardship, and even rank injustice.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 79 Stier, supra note 78, at 729-30; id. at 729 (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *254). 
 80 See id. at 731-32 & nn. 35-36 (compiling an impressive list of similar state 
prohibitions). 
 81 E.g., Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339, 343-46 (1869) (interpreting 
the forfeiture clauses of the 1862 Confiscation Act). 
 82 92 U.S. 202 (1876), modifying Bigelow, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.). 
 83 An Act to Suppress Insurrection, To Punish Treason and Rebellion, To 
Seize and Confiscate the Property of Rebels, and For Other Purposes, 12 Stat. 589, 589-
92 (1863). Originally, the Act was interpreted in 1869 in Bigelow v. Forrest. 76 U.S. (9 
Wall.) at 339. However, Van Riswick later refined the “incautious[ ] ” Bigelow language. 
92 U.S. at 211. 
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have the same meaning, and both seek to limit the extent of 
forfeitures . . . . [a]nd there is no reason why one should receive 
a construction different from that given to the other.”84 The 
Court held that, although it is constitutionally permissible to 
subject a convicted traitor’s estate to complete divesture upon 
conviction and to eliminate a traitor’s property interests,85 the 
Government’s interest is limited to the natural life of the 
traitor; at the cessation of which, the estate divests completely 
from the Government and passes on to the decedent traitor’s 
successors in interest.86 
B. The Equal Protection Clause and Skinner 
In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, the Supreme 
Court considered a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
challenge to a statute that mandated the forced sterilization of 
one class of criminals—common thieves—but not embezzlers, a 
class of criminals that committed essentially the same crime.87 The 
Skinner Court left behind a very simple and powerful legacy 
regarding equal protection under the law: “[W]hen the law lays an 
unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same 
quality of offense . . . it has made as invidious a discrimination as if 
it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive 
treatment.” 88  By charging citizen-terrorist defendants under 
terrorism statutes that impermissibly distinguish between the 
criminal classes of traitors and terrorists, the government works a 
constructive treason. Moreover, by not affording the additional 
protections granted to defendants, the government disparately 
impacts each defendant. 
 
 84 Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 209-10 (1876). 
 85 Id. at 211 (“The [Bigelow] language was, perhaps, incautiously used. We 
certainly did not intend to hold that there was any thing left in the person whose estate 
had been confiscated. The question was not before us. We were not called upon to 
decide any thing respecting the quantity of the estate carved out; and what we said 
upon the subject had reference solely to its duration.”). 
 86 Id. at 209. 
 87 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 
U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942). 
 88 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
244 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
II. TINKER, TERRORIST, CITIZEN, TRAITOR: A STORY OF 
ANWAR AL-AULAQI 
Born in America89 to a Yemeni father,90 Anwar al-Aulaqi 
was a dual American and Yemeni citizen at birth.91 Al-Aulaqi 
lived in the United States until he was seven years old, when 
his family returned to Yemen.92 In 1991, he returned to the 
United States, where he earned a bachelor’s degree at Colorado 
State University, wed a Yemeni cousin, and later received a 
master’s degree in Educational Leadership from San Diego 
State University.93 Al-Aulaqi permanently departed from the 
United States in 2002.94  He spent two years in the United 
Kingdom before finally settling in Yemen in 2004.95 Al-Aulaqi 
remained a U.S. citizen until he died.96 
Before his departure from the United States, al-Aulaqi 
was not a dangerous criminal. His U.S. criminal record 
contains two charges in San Diego from 1996 and 1997, both 
for soliciting prostitution. 97  The Government never indicted 
 
 89 Anwar al-Aulaqi was born April 21, 1971, in Las Cruces, New Mexico. Al-Awlaki: 
Who Was He?, CNN (Sept. 30, 2011, 7:56 AM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/ 
30/al-awlaki-who-was-he/. 
 90 Nasser al-Aulaqi is a Yemeni National. Al-Aulaqi Complaint, supra 
note 13, at ¶ 9. 
 91 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2012) (“[A] person born in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof [is a U.S. citizen] . . . .”); Yemeni Nationality Law, 
Law No. (6) of 1990, art. III § (a), available at http://www.yemenembassy.org/ 
consulate/nationality.htm (granting citizenship by birth to those whose fathers are 
Yemeni Nationals). Anwar al-Aulaqi’s father was a Yemeni National. Al-Aulaqi 
Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶ 9. 
 92 Scott Shane & Souad Mekhennet, From Condemning Terror to Preaching 
Jihad, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at A2. His father was a prominent Yemeni figure, 
serving as chancellor of two universities and a government official. Id. 
 93 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10; Kannof, supra note 24, at 1415-16. 
“Peculiarly, despite his family’s relative wealth, al-Aulaqi falsely claimed that he was 
born in Yemen, rather than the United States, in order to receive $20,000 in 
scholarship money from a U.S. government program for which . . . (even as a dual 
citizen), he should not have been eligible.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 94 Kannof, supra note 24, at 1416. 
 95 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10; see also Kannof, supra note 24, at 1416. 
 96 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 8; see also Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 18, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/a/anwar_al_
awlaki/index.html. 
 97 Al-Awlaki: Who Was He?, CNN (Sept. 30, 2011, 7:56 AM), 
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/30/al-awlaki-who-was-he/. In 1999, the FBI took 
notice of his role in an Islamic charity assumed to be funneling money to terrorists. 
Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 92, at A2. He was questioned about his association 
with Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaq Alhazmi, both of whom were 9/11 Hijackers. Id. The 
FBI released him and no action was taken because they determined his contacts were 
“random” and the “inevitable consequence of living in the small world of Islam in 
America.” Id. The FBI did, however, consider invoking the Mann Act to prosecute al-
Aulaqi, as he “had been observed crossing state lines with prostitutes in the D.C. area.” 
Joseph Rhee & Mark Schone, How Anwar Awlaki Got Away, ABC NEWS (Nov. 30, 
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him for any “terrorism-related crimes.”98 Al-Aulaqi transformed 
into a traitor and a terrorist during his time in Yemen.99 While 
al-Aulaqi was there, the United States grew increasingly 
concerned and requested that the Yemeni authorities hold him 
in custody. After his 18-month detainment in a Yemini prison 
between 2006 and 2007 at the behest of U.S. authorities—
without trial—al-Aulaqi became a violent, active jihadist.100 
In 2009, al-Aulaqi became a leader in AQAP, assuming 
an operational role in the group and purportedly inspiring 
more than a dozen terrorist plots with his clerical rhetoric.101 
He provided “instructions” to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab for 
his attempted bombing of a Christmas-day Northwest Airlines 
flight;102 exchanged e-mails with Major Nidal Hasan, the U.S. 
soldier who perpetrated the Fort Hood Massacre in 2009;103 and 
influenced Faisal Shahzad, the attempted May 2010 Times 
Square Bomber.104 Al-Aulaqi was accused of attempting to send 
bombs via the U.S. mail in October 2010.105 
Al-Aulaqi “made numerous public statements [as a 
cleric and AQAP leader] calling for ‘jihad against the West,’ 
praising the actions of ‘his students’ Abdulmutallab and Hasan, 
and asking others to ‘follow suit.’” 106  His public statements 
included many YouTube videos that reached a wide, English-
speaking audience.107 Al-Aulaqi called for a holy war against 
 
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/FtHoodInvestigation/anwar-awlaki/story?id=9200
720&page=1#.UIbJaLRW3Ek. An arrest warrant was issued for him on passport fraud 
charges, but was later vacated. Id. In Yemen, he was held for eighteen months between 
2006 and 2007 on kidnapping charges, but released without trial. Al-Awlaki: Who Was He?, 
CNN (Sept. 30, 2011, 7:56 AM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/30/al-awlaki-who-was-
he/. He was charged and sentenced to ten years in absentia for “incitement to kill 
foreigners,” relating to his material connection with the Fort Hood shooter and Christmas 
Day Bomber. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10; Al-Awlaki: Who Was He?, CNN (Sept. 30, 
2011, 7:56 AM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/30/al-awlaki-who-was-he/. 
 98 Al-Aulaqi Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶ 24. 
 99 Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 270 (concluding that “Al-Aulaqi was a traitor” 
for the charge of levying of war and adhering to the enemies of the United States based 
on his advocacy for, operative and managerial participation in, and recruitment on 
behalf of the enemy organization AQAP); cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 517, 519-20, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 100 Shane & Mekhennet, supra note 92; see also supra note 97.  
 101 Designation of ANWAR AL-AULAQI Pursuant to Executive Order 13224 
and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, 75 Fed. Reg. 43233-
01 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Al-Aulaqi Designation]; Kannof, supra note 24, at 1381. 
 102 Al-Aulaqi Designation, supra note 101, at 43234. 
 103 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (citations omitted). The incident resulted 
in 13 dead and 22 wounded. Kannof, supra note 24, at 1382. 
 104 Kannof, supra note 24, at 1382. 
 105 Id. at 1383. 
 106 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (citations omitted). 
 107 Kannof, supra note 24, at 1381. 
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the United States, claiming that “‘America is evil . . . . [J]ihad 
against America is binding upon myself just as it is binding on 
every other Muslim . . . .’” 108  He also proclaimed “that he 
‘[would] never surrender’ to the United States.”109 
In classified proceedings, the CIA secretly approved al-
Aulaqi as the target for a “lethal operation” in April 2010.110 Al-
Aulaqi was termed a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” by 
the Treasury Department in July 2010.111 In the summer of 
2010, the CIA tried to eliminate al-Aulaqi through the creative 
use of a Croatian video-order bride, a predator drone, and a 
Danish double agent.112 Nasser al-Aulaqi, Anwar’s father, filed a 
complaint in the District Court for the District of Columbia 
seeking to enjoin the lethal targeting of his son.113 On December 
7, 2010, the matter was dismissed on a motion for summary 
judgment for a lack of standing.114 After failing to kill al-Aulaqi 
in a drone attack in May 2011,115 the United States ended his life 
when, on September 30, 2011, a drone fired a “barrage of 
Hellfire missiles” at his car.116 In July 2012, the ACLU re-filed 
the case as al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, asserting standing based on 
Nassar al-Aulaqi’s status as executor of his son’s estate.117 
 
 108 Paula Newton, Purported al-Awlaki Message Calls for Jihad Against U.S., 
CNN (Mar. 17, 2010) (quoting Anwar al-Aulaqi, YouTube Speech), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2010/WORLD/europe/03/17/al.awlaki.message/index.html. 
 109 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10-11 (citations omitted). 
 110 Greg Miller, Muslim Cleric Aulaqi Is 1st U.S. Citizen on List of Those CIA 
Is Allowed to Kill, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/06/AR2010040604121.html. 
 111 Al-Aulaqi Designation, supra note 101, at 43233-34.  
 112 Paul Cruickshank et al., The Danish Agent, the Croatian Blonde and the 
CIA Plot to Get al-Awlaki, CNN WORLD (Oct. 24, 2012, 8:54 pm), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2012/10/15/world/al-qaeda-cia-marriage-plot/index.html. In sum, the CIA used a 
Danish double agent to arrange a marriage between al-Aulaqi and a blonde Croatian 
devotee who interacted with him via video. Id. When al-Aulaqi and his fiancée were to 
meet up, her luggage was to be bugged and then the CIA would send in a drone to kill 
the entire party, likely with Hellfire missiles; however, her luggage was separated and 
the plot failed. Brian Ross & Lee Ferran, Report: CIA Arranged Bride for Terrorist in 
Plot to Kill Him, ABC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/report-cia-
arranged-bride-terrorist-plot-kill/story?id=17437763#.UJShWml27-Y. The marriage, 
however, was successful. Id. al-Aulaqi’s widow, after deciding against going on a 
revenge suicide bombing, is currently an editor for the al-Qeada publication Inspire. Id. 
 113 See generally Al-Aulaqi Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶ 6. 
 114 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 28, 30. 
 115 Mazzetti et al., supra note 3. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Panetta Complaint, supra note 20, at ¶¶ 6, 10, 41-3. Samir Kahn’s family 
joined the lawsuit. Id. 
2013] TWIN PERILS OF THE AL-AULAQI CASE 247 
III. THE CRIMES OF TREASON BY LEVYING WAR AND 
TERRORISM 
A. Treason by Levying War: The Offense 
James Willard Hurst, author of the seminal treatise The 
Law of Treason in the United States,118 defined treason through 
levying war as the “direct effort to overthrow the government, 
or wholly to supplant its authority in some part or all of its 
territory.”119 The law of levying war has been subject to several 
constructions that parse the law into three components: the 
actus reus element, the mens rea element and attendant 
allegiance requirement, and the geographic bounds. Levying war 
requires that an assemblage of men make an overt act of force to 
execute a treasonable design.120 The overt act requirement may 
be met where the assembly itself is forceful.121 
 
 118 HURST, supra note 27. This work is considered the “classic legal treatise on 
this constitutional topic.” Roland, supra note 56, at 297. 
 119 HURST, supra note 27, at 199. 
 120 Whether the force used is tantamount to levying war is a question of fact. 
Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 118 (1807) (“[I]t [i]s impossible to define what 
should in every case be deemed a levying of war. It is a question of fact to be decided by 
the jury from all the circumstances.”). Fortunately, however, the sparse federal treason 
jurisprudence can offer some direct and quite blunt light on the relationship between 
acts of levying of war and terrorism. In deciding the fate of the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombers, the Second Circuit held in Rahman, that terrorist acts (factually 
analogous to those al-Aulaqi was engaged in) are “ample evidence . . . [of] levy[ing] 
war.” 189 F.3d 88, 149-61 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see id. at 149-60 (affirming that 
facts such as calling for jihad and participating in the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing were sufficient evidence for sustaining a conviction of seditious conspiracy to 
levy war and that the sentencing guidelines for treason by levying war were the “most 
analogous.”); accord United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2444 (2012); United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987). 
 121 Originally, Chief Justice Marshall defined the actus reus of treason by 
levying of war as “an assemblage of persons for the purpose of effecting by force a 
treasonable purpose.” Bollman, 8 U.S (4 Cranch) at 75 (Marshall, C.J.). He later 
clarified this part of his Bollman opinion, holding that an assembly is a precondition 
for the overt acts and, if the assembly is in force, then it will constitute the overt act 
itself. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2, 13 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va., 
1807) (No. 14692a) (discussing the meaning of the Supreme Court in Bollman); see also 
Opinion on The Motion To Introduce Certain Evidence in the Trial of Aaron Burr, For 
Treason, United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 455, 487 (1807) (Marshall, Circuit 
Justice) (“[A]n assemblage of men which should constitute the fact of levying war, must 
be an assemblage in force [as Chief Justice Marshall understands his opinion in 
Bollman]. . . .”). The likely reason for this distinction is that peaceable assemblies also 
exist. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Justice Story’s later interpretation of the actus reus of 
treason in 1842 upholds this distinction. In re Charge to Grand Jury – Treason, 30 F. 
Cas. 1046, 1047 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C. D.R.I. 1842) (“To constitute an actual levy 
of war, there must be an assembly of persons, met for the treasonable purpose, and 
some overt act done, or some attempt made by them [the assembly] with force to 
execute, or towards executing, that purpose.”). 
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The assemblage portion of the actus reus element 
requires that there be more than one participant assembled to 
levy war because, historically, levying war alone would have 
been factually impossible—a single person was “not in a 
condition to levy war.”122 Although this assumption has been 
questioned in the wake of technological advances in the 
destructive potential of modern weapons, 123  an assemblage 
remains an element of treason. 
Turning to the mens rea element: “The character of the 
intention . . . rather than any difference in the overt acts, 
marks the line between riot and treason by levying war.”124 The 
mens rea element has two prongs: first, one must betray an 
owed allegiance to the United States; second, the actor must 
have a treasonable, or public, purpose or intent. The first prong 
requires a pre-existing allegiance; there can be no betrayal 
without an initial allegiance.125 Further, to betray, one must 
intend “to benefit the enemy’s war effort and to harm that of 
the United States.”126 An intent to betray may be inferred by 
presuming the actor intended the natural consequences of his 
or her actions.127 The treasonable design or purpose prong can 
be established through the demonstration that an alleged 
traitor had a non-private motive to disrupt Government 
administration of laws, or to coerce or change its policy.128 Holy 
war likely is not a private motivation.129 
 
 122 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 169 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. 
Va., 1807) (No. 14693). 
 123 Larson, supra note 24, at 913-14 (“[S]uch a person can be said to levy war 
against the United States; it would strain all credulity to assert, for example, that 
there must be at least two people in the cockpit of the plane in order for war to be 
levied.”). 
 124 HURST, supra note 27, at 200. 
 125 Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 29 (1944); accord Augustin, 661 F.3d 
1105; Rahman, 189 F.3d 88; Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318; HURST, supra note 27, at 193. 
 126 HURST, supra note 27, at 244. 
 127 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 32 (“Since intent must be inferred from conduct of 
some sort, we think it is permissible to draw usual reasonable inferences as to 
intent . . . . The law of treason . . . assumes every man to intend the natural 
consequences which one standing in his circumstances and possessing his knowledge 
would reasonably expect to result from his acts.”). 
 128 In re Charge to the Grand Jury – Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1046, 1047 (Story, 
Circuit Justice, C.C. D.R.I. 1842); United States v. Hanway, 26 F. Cas. 105, 115 (C.C. 
E.D. Pa. 1851). 
 129 See John Brown’s Speech to the Court at His Trial, NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. 
POL’Y RESEARCH, http://www.nationalcenter.org/JohnBrown%27sSpeech.html (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2013) (internal citations omitted) (“[The Bible] [t]hat teaches me that 
all things whatsoever I would that men should do to me, I should do even so to them. It 
teaches me, further, to remember them that are in bonds, as bound with them. I 
endeavored to act up to that instruction. I say I am yet too young to understand that 
God is any respecter of persons. I believe that to have interfered as I have done—as I 
 
2013] TWIN PERILS OF THE AL-AULAQI CASE 249 
Regarding geography, courts have consistently held that 
treason may be committed anywhere by anyone who owes 
allegiance to the United States.130 That is to say, there is no 
place where acts constituting treason would be immunized 
from prosecution. 
B. The Crime of Terrorism in the Era of the War on Terror 
Terrorism is defined in a variety of U.S. statutes. 131 
Many of these laws contain nearly identical text.132 This note 
will consider two definitions of terrorism: the most popular 
one,133 the FISA definition, and the definition of the “Federal 
crime of terrorism.”134 
The FISA definition contains three elements: an actus 
reus, a violent crime that is a violation of the laws of the 
United States or its individual states;135 the proper mens rea, 
an intent to “influence the policy of a government by 
 
have always freely admitted I have done—in behalf of His despised poor was not 
wrong, but right. Now, if it is deemed necessary that I should forfeit my life for the 
furtherance of the ends of justice, and mingle my blood further with the blood of my 
children and with the blood of millions in this slave country whose rights are 
disregarded by wicked, cruel, and unjust enactments—I submit; so let it be done!”). 
Despite his religious motivations, John Brown was executed for treason against the 
State of Virginia. Id. 
 130 Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 734-35 (1952) (citing Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 126 (1807)). 
 131 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2012) (defining the “Federal crime of 
terrorism”); see also Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of 
Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 255 & n.48 (2004) (listing 
the statutes). 
 132 Compare, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2011) (defining “international 
terrorism”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (defining “international terrorism” with a slightly 
different jurisdictional element in subsection (C) than the one at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1801(c)(3)). For a thorough discussion of the prevalence of this language in terrorism 
definitions, see Perry, supra note 131, at 256-57. 
 133 Perry, supra note 131, at 256. 
 134 The statute reads in relevant part: 
(5) the term “Federal crime of terrorism” means an offense that— 
(A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by 
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct; and 
(B) is a violation of— 
(i) . . . [relating to various violent crimes] 
(ii) . . . [relating to atomic weapons crime] 
(iii) . . . [relating to various aircraft crimes] 
(iv) . . . [relating to narco-terrorism]. 
18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). 
 135 Id. § 1801(c)(1). 
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intimidation or coercion”;136 and the requirement that the act 
occurs “outside the United States, or transcend[s] national 
boundaries.”137 The federal crime definition has two elements: 
an actus reus, a violent crime; and the mens rea requirement 
that the act be “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of 
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against 
government conduct.”138 
C. The Same Offense: Treason By Levying War and 
Terrorism 
Although Equal Protection Clause and Treason Clause 
decisions use different language—”intrinsically the same quality 
of offense”139 and immaterially varying the substance of treason,140 
respectively—both sets of language mean that analysis under 
either is triggered if the two offenses are substantively the same. 
Comparing the actus reus of treason by levying war and 
that of the two terrorism definitions, there is obvious 
commonality. Both require some sort of violent act or force.141 
Although the FISA definition stands apart in requiring that 
the act be criminal, this distinction does not create a material 
difference between the definitions of treason by levying war 
and terrorism. Most violent acts are criminal; or, more 
specifically, any act that is tantamount to terrorism would be 
tantamount to levying war. Therefore, FISA’s additional 
requirement does not narrow the scope of acts that fall within 
the definition of terrorism. 
Comparing the mens rea element—the most important 
element 142 —it becomes even clearer that the crimes are 
substantively indistinguishable. Treason by levying war 
requires the intent to coerce or force change in government 
policy, or to usurp government power in all or part of its 
territory.143 FISA’s terrorism definition requires the intent to 
 
 136 Id. § 1801(c)(2)(B). 
 137 Id. § 1801(c)(3). 
 138 Id. § 2332b(g)(5)(A)–(B). 
 139 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 140 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 141 Compare Part III.A (discussing the actus reus of treason by levying war, 
the violent force of levying war), with Part III.B. (discussing the elements of terrorism, 
including the actus reus of force). 
 142 HURST, supra note 27, at 200. 
 143 Id. at 199; see also In re Charge to the Grand Jury – Treason, 30 F. Cas. at 
1047 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C. D.R.I. 1842); United States v. Hanway, 26 F. Cas. 
105, 115 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1851). 
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influence or to coerce the policy of government by force.144 The 
“Federal crime” definition of terrorism requires that the act “is 
calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by 
intimidation or coercion . . . .”145 The FISA definition’s failure to 
specify the U.S. government is of no consequence as applied to 
citizen-terrorists—in this case persons conducting jihad against 
the United States in the ongoing War on Terror. Thus, in the 
context at issue, there is no material difference between the 
mens rea requirements of treason and terrorism. 
There is no basis for distinction between the two crimes 
with respect to the elements, or lack of elements, regarding 
geography, assemblage, and allegiance. First, the geographical 
limitation in the FISA definition does not, by itself, make that 
offense materially different from treason because treason may 
be committed anywhere. Therefore, the potential geographic 
range of the two crimes overlap such that all FISA terrorism is 
treason but not all treason is FISA terrorism.146 Further, the 
argument that geographic limitations by themselves create 
substantively different offenses leads to absurd conclusions.147  
Imagine if Congress were to create two crimes, A and B, 
which, with the exception of adding geographic limits, mirror 
the crime of treason by levying war. Crime A only punishes 
acts performed within the boundaries of the United States; 
crime B only punishes acts performed outside of the boundaries 
of the United States. The Government would never need to 
indict any citizen for treason to punish treasonous acts, 
because in all cases it could achieve the same result by 
prosecuting the citizen under either crime A or B. Therefore, the 
government would not be constrained by the administratively 
cumbersome evidentiary and substantive protections afforded to 
the accused at a treason trial because any instance of treason 
could be punished under either A or B. That is to say, by 
dividing the world into whatever arbitrary components it found 
desirable, Congress could dodge the restrictive definitions of 
the Treason Clause. This is precisely the result that the 
Framers sought to avoid in drafting the Treason Clause; the 
Constitution will not allow the introduction of a geographical  
 144 § 1801(c)(2)(B). 
 145 § 2332b(g)(5)(A). 
 146 Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 734-35 (1952). In Kawakita, the 
Court held that an American-Japanese dual citizen owed allegiance to the United 
States even while domiciled in Japan during World War II and thus, his acts in Japan 
were treason. Id.; see also Carlisle v. United States (The Carlisle Case), 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 147, 154-55 (1873). 
 147 See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
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limitation to create a crime distinct from treason. When a 
citizen commits an act of terrorism, geographical limitations in 
the definition of terrorism cannot form a basis for 
differentiating it from treason when they are substantively the 
same in all other material aspects. 
Second, although the traditional notion of treason 
requires an assemblage, there are three reasons why this 
unique facet does not intrinsically distinguish treason from 
terrorism in the context of al-Aulaqi. First, although one 
person may commit terrorism and only an assemblage may 
levy war, as applied to a citizen-terrorist conducting jihad 
against the United States in tandem with a terrorist 
organization, that terrorist has clearly assembled in force. The 
same reasoning would apply to any such citizen-terrorist, so the 
express requirement in treason of multiple persons would be a 
distinction without a difference. For example, in making the 
decision to issue a kill order against al-Aulaqi, the President 
took specific note of al-Aulaqi’s operational role in AQAP, a 
group that is easily described as an enemy assemblage of 
persons levying war against the United States. 148  This fact 
permits the inference that al-Aulaqi’s association with an 
assemblage of men levying war against the United States 
informed the decision to target him for death. Second, the 
assemblage element is outdated and outmoded, reflecting a 
court determination that one man levying war is a factual 
impossibility—modern terrorists have shown that is no longer 
an impossibility.149 Therefore, the assemblage element creates 
no distinction in War on Terror cases such as al-Aulaqi’s, and 
the common-law inclusion of the element could not survive 
review on its merits. 
Third, although treason requires a betrayal of a pre-
existing allegiance to the United States, this distinction from 
terrorism is similarly immaterial within the context of al-
Aulaqi. By definition, a citizen owes allegiance to his or her 
 
 148 Mazzetti et al., supra note 3 (quoting President Barack Obama) (“‘The 
death of Awlaki is a major blow to Al Qaeda’s most active operational affiliate . . . [al-
Aulaqi took] the lead role in planning and directing the efforts to murder innocent 
Americans.’”). 
 149 See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-
458, 118 Stat. 3637 (2004) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)) (the FISA “lone wolf” 
terrorist provision); Larson, supra note 24, at 913-14 (“[S]uch a person can be said to 
levy war against the United States; it would strain all credulity to assert, for example, 
that there must be at least two people in the cockpit of the plane in order for war to be 
levied.”); see also supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing Larson and 
assemblage); infra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing Larson and 
assemblage). 
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country.150 Owing an allegiance to the United States is a factual 
precondition for the commission of treason. 151  Further, as a 
matter of construction, the omission of an express allegiance 
requirement does not in any degree affect the analysis of a 
court construing a statute for similarity to treason. 152  For 
example, a person owing allegiance only to Russia could not be 
charged with treason against the United States even if the U.S. 
treason statute at issue lacked an allegiance element. While 
comparing the treason and misprision of treason statutes, 
Chief Justice Marshall observed in United States v. Wiltberger: 
The 1st section defines the crime of treason, and declares, that if any 
person or persons owing allegiance to the United States of America 
shall levy war,” & c. “such person or persons shall be adjudged guilty 
of treason,” & c. The second section defines misprision of treason; 
and in the description of the persons who may commit it, omits the 
words “owing allegiance to the United States,” and uses without 
limitation, the general terms “any person or persons.” Yet, it has 
been said, these general terms were obviously intended to be limited, 
and must be limited, by the words “owing allegiance to the United 
States,” which are used in the preceding section. 
It is admitted, that the general terms of the 2d section must be so 
limited; but it is not admitted, that the inference drawn from this 
circumstance, in favour of incorporating the words of one section of 
this act into another, is a fair one. Treason is a breach of allegiance, 
and can be committed by him only who owes allegiance either 
perpetual or temporary. The words . . . “owing allegiance to the 
United States,” in the first section, are entirely surplus words, which 
do not, in the slightest degree, affect its sense. The construction 
would be precisely the same were they omitted. When, therefore, we 
give the same construction to the second section, we do not carry those 
words into it, but construe it as it would be construed independent of 
the first. There is, too, in a penal statute, a difference between 
restraining general words, and enlarging particular words.153 
Thus, in light of Wiltberger, the omission of an 
allegiance requirement from the terrorism definitions is a 
distinction from treason without a difference. 
By definition, as a citizen, al-Aulaqi owed allegiance to 
the United States. His operational involvement in a professed 
holy war against the United States while maintaining 
 
 150 Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 721-23 (holding that citizens owe allegiance 
regardless of where they are domiciled). This allegiance is owed even if the individual 
holds a dual citizenship. Id. 
 151 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96-97 (1820). 
 152 Id.  
 153 Id. (interpreting the treason statute, which is now codified at 18 U.S.C 
§ 2381). 
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citizenship permits the inference that he intended to betray 
that allegiance by acts tantamount to levying war. Al-Aulaqi’s 
conduct that led to his killing involved citizens operating with 
terrorist organizations: he influenced and encouraged others, 
which is action taken in tandem with an assembly. Further, 
terrorist acts analogous to those in which al-Aulaqi was 
engaged 154  have been described as “ample evidence . . . [of] 
levy[ing] war” by the Second Circuit and similarly by its sister 
Circuits.155 Therefore, al-Aulaqi was both a traitor and a terrorist. 
IV. THE FIRST PERIL: THE TREASON CLAUSE 
The Supreme Court has held for over 150 years that 
creating merely artificial distinctions between treason and 
another crime may not circumvent the Treason Clause’s specific 
protections. 156  Because the crimes of treason and terrorism 
(when committed by a citizen) are essentially 
indistinguishable, either the punishment of citizens for 
terrorism or the adjudication of them as a terrorist should 
invoke Treason Clause protections 157  by virtue of the rule 
against constructive treasons. This part discusses applications 
of the rule against constructive treasons and how it applies to 
al-Aulaqi’s case. This section concludes that the rule against 
constructive treasons is violated in the case where the 
defendant is a citizen-terrorist charged with terrorism offenses. 
 
 154 See supra Part II (calling for jihad against the United States, encouraging 
terrorism, and planning and assisting in the operations of a terrorist organization that 
has claimed responsibility for attacking the United States); see also Dreyfuss, supra 
note 24, at 269-70 (stating that al-Aulaqi had levied war).  
 155 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 149-61 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) 
(affirming that facts such as calling for jihad and participating in the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing were sufficient evidence for sustaining a conviction of seditious 
conspiracy to levy war and that the sentencing guidelines for treason by levying war 
were the “most analogous.”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1094 (2000); accord United States v. 
Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2444 (2012); United 
States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987); see 
also supra note 120. 
 156 See supra note 63. 
 157 These exceptions include, e.g., the two-witness evidentiary requirement 
and the prohibition on corruptions of blood, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, all due criminal 
procedural rights, and the right to trial by jury. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 
117, 119-20 (1970). The Bollman opinion also notes that the bench-warrant issued 
against Aaron Burr was illegal because a grand jury had not been presented with the 
matter, and the offense was not committed in the presence of the court. 8 U.S. (4 
Cranch) 75, 113-14 (1807). For a discussion of the right to a jury trial in treason cases, 
see infra Part V.A.2.a. 
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A. The Rule Against Constructive Treasons Revisited 
The rule against constructive treasons must be applied 
to al-Aulaqi’s case, as terrorism and treason are essentially the 
same offense. 158  Unfortunately, the lack of treason cases 159 
leaves very few applications of the rule against constructive 
treasons. The resulting doctrinal underdevelopment and courts’ 
use of loose and amorphous terms, such as “vary[ ] ” 160  to 
describe alterations to treason has created interpretive 
problems. This looseness in language has led to at least one 
drastic misapplication of the rule in Supreme Court precedent 
and several questionable Circuit decisions. 161  The resulting 
doctrinal ambiguity has eviscerated the constructive treason 
defense, the assertion by defendants that their prosecution 
under a particular crime is a prohibited constructive treason 
prosecution. This section discusses the contours of the rule, its 
misapplication by the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, and 
provides a reading that harmonizes Supreme Court precedent, 
while providing a solid precedential basis for reversing the 
Circuits and restoring the defense against constructive treason. 
1. Three Formulations of the Rule 
Upon close reading and as identified in this note for the 
first time, Supreme Court precedent reveals that three 
particular methods of manipulating the treason definition are 
prohibited under the rule against constructive treasons. Taken 
in tandem, these forms of the rule provide a cohesive 
framework for analyzing any variance from or manipulation of 
the definition of treason. The rule against constructive treasons 
may thus be formulated in three different ways, termed 
mirroring, additive, and subtractive. 
The mirroring formulation of the rule prohibits 
Congress from creating a constructive treason by mirroring the 
elements of treason and merely changing the name of the crime. 
Under the Constitution, treason by any other name remains 
 
 158 See supra Part III.C. 
 159 HURST, supra note 27, at 187 (“There have been less than two score treason 
prosecutions pressed to trial by the Federal government.”). 
 160 Id. at 239. 
 161 See infra Part IV.A.3. 
256 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
treason, subject to Article III restrictions and protections.162 The 
Court expressly adopted this formulation in Cramer.163 
Under the additive formulation of the rule, Congress 
may not create a constructive treason by inventing a new crime 
that would otherwise be treason but for the addition of 
immaterial elements. For example, Congress could not pass a 
statute that mirrors treason but for an additional element that 
the overt act must be done while wearing a red hat. That law 
would only alter treason by an immaterial element.164 Adding 
immaterial requirements to treason and thus merely relabeling 
it creates a constructive treason. In Bollman, the Court held 
that the addition of a conspiracy element creates a crime 
materially distinct from treason itself, and thus, because the 
addition makes the crime substantively distinguishable, 
conspiracy to commit treason by levying war does not carry 
Article III protection.165 The Bollman opinion thus shows that 
the addition of a materially different element—the actus reus 
of agreement rather than a violent act—creates a separate 
crime from treason.166 
The subtractive formulation of the rule is somewhat 
more nuanced than the others. Congress may not codify an 
offense that provides for harsher punishment than that 
permitted by Article III, but in its description merely subtracts 
an element of treason and, as applied to a particular defendant, 
 
 162 Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945) (“[The Court does 
not] . . . intimate that Congress could dispense with the two-witness rule merely by 
giving the same offense [treason] another name.”).  
 163 See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45.  
 164 For an example of a statute that is materially different enough from treason by 
levying war to avoid this rule, see the Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 217 (1917). 
 165 See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 126-28 (1807) (“To conspire to 
levy war, and actually to levy war, are distinct offences . . . it has been determined that 
the actual enlistment of men to serve against the government does not amount to 
levying war . . . . [T]he crime of treason should not be extended by construction to 
doubtful cases; and that crimes not clearly within the constitutional definition, should 
receive such punishment as the legislature in its wisdom may provide . . . a 
combination or conspiracy to levy war against the United States is not treason, unless 
combined with an attempt to carry such combination or conspiracy into execution; some 
actual force or violence must be used in pursuance of such design to levy war . . . .”); cf. 
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). While the reasoning is discussed infra, Part IV.A.3, 
Quirin actually is an example of the Court applying this sort of reasoning. 
 166 This reading of Bollman is subject to the alternative reading that there is 
both an addition and a subtraction to the crime of conspiracy to levy war crime: the 
addition of an overt act of agreement and the subtraction of force requirement. 
However, this is a nominal distinction. If the subtraction itself were the material 
difference, the crime would have been subject to the subtractive formulation below, 
yielding a different result. The addition of the different actus reus created a separately 
cognizable offense in all cases. The formulations may operate in conjunction and the 
aim is to find material distinction. 
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would be treason.167 As the Supreme Court held in Wiltberger, a 
citizen may not constitutionally be punished under a 
congressionally created statute that mirrors treason but omits 
the allegiance requirement and provides for process inconsistent 
with Article III protections.168 Because, by default, a citizen owes 
an allegiance to the country, the actions for which that citizen is 
to be punished would be indistinguishable from treason. To 
permit such a manipulation would eviscerate the Treason 
Clause of any meaning. This formulation is more limited than 
the other two. The subtractive formulation only invalidates a 
statute as applied to circumstances where all the elements of 
treason are satisfied—it can never render a statute facially 
invalid. Although the hypothetical statute is perfectly valid as 
applied to those who do not owe allegiance, it would constitute 
a constructive treason if applied to a citizen. This formulation 
is more of a cannon of construction, where, as applied, a statute 
must be construed to avoid creating a constructive treason. 
In light of these formulations, the rule against 
constructive treasons may seem expansive at first impression. 
But there is a limiting principle: the gravamen of the offense 
must be materially the same as that of treason, and the conviction 
must not have been in accord with Treason Clause protections.169 
Thus, the crime alleged to be a constructive treason must punish 
“a direct effort to overthrow the government [by one owing 
allegiance], or wholly to supplant its authority in some part or all 
of its territory”170  for a non-private motive.171  For example, an 
offence criminalizing a direct effort to overthrow the Government 
or to supplant its authority for solely private motives is not a 
constructive treason, but more properly construed as espionage 
because of the lack of a public motivation.172 
Although the rule against constructive treasons 
prohibits the use of a law that immaterially varies from treason 
to punish a citizen, a citizen may be punished under a statute 
that, although overlapping in elements, materially differs from 
 
 167 See supra note 153 and accompanying text; see also Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45. 
 168 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96-97 (1820) (Marshall, 
C.J.); see supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 169 See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 127 (1807) (“[T]he crime of 
treason should not be extended by construction . . . . [C]rimes not clearly within the 
constitutional definition, should receive such punishment as the legislature . . . may 
provide.”); see also supra note 63. 
 170 HURST, supra note 27, at 186, 199. 
 171 Charge to the Grand Jury – Treason, 30 F. Cas. at 1047. 
 172 See HURST, supra note 27, at 239-40 (discussing the Rosenberg case that 
was before the Second Circuit. 195 F.2d 583, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1952)). 
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treason.173 If any single difference is material, then the crime is 
substantively distinguishable from treason, and the offense is not 
subject to the restrictions of the Treason Clause.174 
2. The Three Formulations Applied 
An application of the three formulations of the rule 
against constructive treasons reveals that neither the FISA nor 
the Federal crime definition of terrorism may be constitutionally 
applied to citizens. Both the FISA and Federal crime definitions 
of terrorism punish the same actus reus and mens rea as 
treason.175 Because both definitions of terrorism omit treason’s 
allegiance requirement and the FISA definition imports a 
geographical limitation,176 the mirroring formulation of the rule 
against constructive treasons is not implicated.177 However, the 
omission of the allegiance and assemblage requirements from 
both definitions implicates the subtractive formulation of the 
rule, and the geographic limitation within the FISA definition 
implicates the additive formulation. 
As discussed above in Part IV.A.1, the omission of an 
allegiance element is immaterial because, when applied to a 
citizen, there is no material difference between acts that could be 
prosecuted as treason, and those that could be prosecuted as 
terrorism.178 Further, in Wiltberger, the Supreme Court expressly 
stated that the omission of an allegiance element does not affect 
the construction of treason when comparing the requirements 
of the treason statute to the requirements of other laws.179 
The omission of an assemblage element is likewise 
immaterial when the terrorism definitions are applied to al-
Aulaqi’s conduct. First, in al-Aulaqi’s case, his role as “leader of 
external operations” in AQAP 180  requires an assemblage. 
Second, as applied to any citizen who is conducting jihad 
against America in connection with a terrorist organization, 
the shared jihad of the movement constitutes an “assemblage 
 
 173 See Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 126-27. 
 174 See id. at 127. 
 175 See supra Part III.C. 
 176 See supra Part III.C. 
 177 See supra Part I. 
 178 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 179 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96-97 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.). 
 180 Mazzetti et al., supra note 3 (“‘The death of Awlaki is a major blow to Al 
Qaeda’s most active operational affiliate . . . [al-Aulaqi took] the lead role in planning 
and directing the efforts to murder innocent Americans.’”). 
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in force.”181 Third, the circumstances that underpinned Marshall 
reading an assemblage requirement into the definition of 
treason have unraveled in the wake of advances in modern 
weapons technology.182 
The imposition of a geographical limitation on the act of 
terrorism cannot, under the additive formulation, create a crime 
distinct from treason. If the acts are committed by a citizen, as 
discussed above, such a holding leads to absurd conclusions. The 
Court may not permit the arbitrary geographic petitioning of 
treason to create a distinction from terrorism where none exists.183 
It would be absurd to claim, for example, that Benedict Arnold 
would be an international terrorist under the FISA definition 
and not a traitor if all of his treacherous acts took place in Britain, 
rather than West Point.184 Or, more narrowly, that he might not 
be afforded Treason Clause protections under the Constitution 
because of the geographical distinction. 
So what is the effect of this analysis in al-Aulaqi’s case? 
The rule against constructive treasons would apply to all state 
 
 181 Opinion on The Motion To Introduce Certain Evidence in the Trial of 
Aaron Burr, For Treason, United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 455, 487 (1807) 
(Marshall, Circuit Justice) (Fed. Cas. Number 14692a); see also supra note 121. 
 182 The Supreme Court has recognized before that a change in technology or 
other circumstance may render irrelevant a previous understanding of a constitutional 
provision. For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court noted: 
West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding of 
facts, changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the 
earlier constitutional resolutions. Each case was comprehensible as the 
Court’s response to facts that the country could understand, or had come to 
understand already, but which the Court of an earlier day, as its own 
declarations disclosed, had not been able to perceive . . . . In constitutional 
adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose new 
obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each decision 
to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court’s constitutional duty. 
505 U.S. 833, 863-64 (1992). In the context of treason, Larson’s argument that the 
advances in weaponry since the Marshall Court have altered the military landscape, 
see supra notes 123, 149 and accompanying text, make a compelling case for a similar 
change in the law of treason with respect to the necessity of an assemblage. 
 183 This point was previously made through a reductio ad absurdum form of 
argument, see supra Part III.C (giving a longer and logically precise reductio ad 
absurdum form of argument on this point). To briefly illustrate the point by way of 
literary example: in Green Eggs and Ham, Dr. Seuss, through the protagonist, 
attempts to make an exhaustive list of the places in which the protagonist refused to 
breakfast: “I would not eat them here or there. I would not eat them anywhere.” DR. 
SEUSS, GREEN EGGS AND HAM 24 (1960). However, his refusal to eat them either here 
or there is clearly subsumed within his refusal to eat them anywhere. Similarly, an act 
of terrorism committed by a citizen, either here or there, is clearly subsumed by the 
definition of an act of treason committed anywhere. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 
U.S. 717 (1952) (holding that treason may be committed anywhere). 
 184 See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 734-35 (1952) (holding that a 
treasonous act may be committed by a citizen extraterritorially). 
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actions,185 including those of the CIA—an agency within the 
executive branch—and the Executive. Thus, although the 
determination to place al-Aulaqi on a kill list was made by the 
CIA and not the Judiciary, the same rule against constructive 
treasons constrains the CIA’s ability to draw immaterial 
distinctions between treason and another crime in deciding to 
kill al-Aulaqi without Article III process. 
3. The Problematic Case of Ex parte Quirin 
The rule against constructive treasons has been called into 
question by commentators186  based on dicta in a controversial 
1942 Supreme Court case, Ex parte Quirin.187 However, these 
commentators fundamentally misread the dicta from that case. 
a. The Quirin Problem: Herbert Haupt, Nazi Saboteur 
and U.S. Citizen 
U.S. citizen Herbert Haupt and six other Nazis sought a 
writ of habeas corpus to avoid trial under military jurisdiction.188 
Haupt and his crew were caught by the FBI after they landed by 
submarine in Florida and arrived in New York City dressed as 
civilians.189 The Quirin Court addressed whether a U.S. citizen 
acting as a Nazi saboteur could lawfully be tried for unlawful 
belligerency—a crime under the “Hague Convention and the law 
of war” incorporated by an Act of Congress—rather than 
treason.190  The Court held that an additional requirement—
 
 185 HURST, supra note 27, at 165 (“[T]he treason clause[ ]  [is] clearly [a] limitation[ 
] upon all the agencies of government, instead of . . . the legislative branch only.”). 
 186 Larson, supra note 24, at 894-900; James Willard Hurst, Treason in the 
United States, 58 HARV. L. REV. 395, 421 (1945) (“On the other hand, where the 
defendant is charged with conduct involving all the elements of treason within the 
constitutional definition, and the gravamen of the accusation against him is an effort to 
subvert the government, or aid its enemies, it would seem in disregard of the policy of the 
Constitution to permit him to be tried under another charge than ‘treason.’ However, the 
decision in Ex parte Quirin casts considerable doubt on the validity of this analysis.”), 
rpt’d in HURST, supra note 27 at 147; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 187 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18-19, aff ’g 47 F. Supp. 431 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (finding 
that a writ of habeas corpus may not issue for Quirin and six others), aff ’d on other 
grounds, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516, 548-49 (2004) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added) (affirming the general ability of the Government to treat enemy 
belligerents as such in a “foreign theater of war”; however, not affirming the 
interpretation that Quirin allows for no limitation on the Government power based on 
citizenship: “Ex parte Quirin . . . may perhaps be claimed for the proposition that the 
American citizenship of such a captive does not as such limit the Government’s power 
to deal with him under the usages of war.”). 
 188 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1. 
 189 Id. at 18-19. 
 190 Id. at 37-8. 
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that the actor not be wearing a military uniform—
differentiated unlawful belligerency from treason. This 
distinction arguably called into question the rule against 
constructive treasons. 191  No doubt because of the seemingly 
obvious immateriality of the addition of the no-uniform 
requirement to what would otherwise be treason.192 
Commentators have asserted that Quirin is contrary to 
the rule against constructive treasons. 193  Because Quirin 
permitted Congress to enact a crime that added presumably 
immaterial elements to the crime of treason, it does appear to 
be a departure from the Court’s longstanding adherence to the 
rule against constructive treasons. However, instead of casting 
doubt on the rule itself, Quirin merely represents a 
questionable application of the rule, to which commentators 
have ascribed too much weight. This is especially true in light 
of its narrow applicability194 and the availability of a reading of 
Quirin that does not negate the rule. 
There are five convincing reasons why Quirin should 
not be construed as contrary to the rule against constructive 
treasons and why, instead, it should be limited to its facts. 
First, Quirin’s language regarding treason is merely “dict[a]”195 
as no treason charge was before the Court. It is well-settled that 
the Court “will not bind [itself] unnecessarily to passing dict[a].”196 
Second, Quirin is a wartime case. As Court precedent from this 
era, a “time of war and of grave public danger,” 197  shows, 
wartime cases often make bad law.198 The Court at that time 
was known for giving significant latitude to the Government 
during war that may not be acceptable boundaries of conduct 
today. 199  Third, the Quirin dicta has received decidedly  
 191 Id. at 38. 
 192 Id. (addition of a uniform is “irrelevant” to treason). 
 193 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 113 (per curiam) (1999) (stating 
that the Quirin “dictum” suggests that “citizens could be tried for an offense against 
the law of war that included all the elements of treason.”); HURST, supra note 27, at 
147; Larson, supra note 24, at 894-900 (stating that Hamdi repeats the error of Ex 
parte Quirin in eviscerating the Treason Clause of meaning). 
 194 Besides the analysis that follows, there is some jurisprudential basis for 
reading Quirin as narrowly holding that the Government has a right to exercise 
military jurisdiction over a U.S. citizen in certain circumstances. See N.Y. Times Co. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 526 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); cf. Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569-72 & n.4 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 195 Rahman, 189 F.3d at 113 (comparing Ex parte Quirin with Cramer). 
 196 See, e.g., S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). 
 197 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942). 
 198 E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See generally 
Eugene Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L. J. 489 (1945)). 
 199 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 715 & n.45 and accompanying text (4th ed. 2011) (citing Rostow, supra note 
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negative reviews from both well-regarded commentators200 and 
Supreme Court Justices.201 Fourth, Herbert Haupt’s “mission 
was to act as a secret agent, spy[,] and saboteur for the German 
Reich.” These sorts of overt acts are relegated to the realm of 
adhering to the enemy by giving aid and comfort, not the 
levying of war.202 Fifth, Quirin’s reliance on the powers of the 
President under the usages of war was severely limited by the 
1957 decision, Reid v. Covert. Covert causes a crime under the 
“Hague Convention and the law of war” and incorporated by an 
Act of Congress to subordinate to the requirements of the 
Constitution generally, and thus, of import to this note, the 
Treason Clause.203 
Even assuming the Quirin dicta stood as good law, a close 
reading does support a negation of the rule against constructive 
treasons. The language at issue in Quirin is a very terse 
treatment of the issue of treason versus unlawful belligerency: 
Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not 
relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is 
unlawful because in violation of the law of war. Citizens who 
associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy 
government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this 
country bent on hostile acts are enemy belligerents within the 
meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war. It is as an 
enemy belligerent that petitioner Haupt is charged with entering the 
United States, and unlawful belligerency is the gravamen of the 
offense of which he is accused. 
The argument leaves out of account the nature of the offense which 
the Government charges and which the Act of Congress, by 
incorporating the law of war, punishes. It is that each petitioner, in 
circumstances which gave him the status of an enemy belligerent, 
passed our military and naval lines and defenses or went behind 
those lines, in civilian dress and with hostile purpose. The offense 
was complete when with that purpose they entered-or, having so 
entered, they remained upon-our territory in time of war without 
 
198); Rostow, supra note 198 (“Korematsu is objectionable because the government 
used race alone as the basis for predicting who was a threat to national security and 
who would remain free.”). 
 200 E.g., HURST, supra note 27, at 147-48; Larson, supra note 24, at 894-900. 
 201 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(internal citations omitted) (“The case was not this Court’s finest hour. The Court 
upheld the commission and denied relief in a brief per curiam issued the day after oral 
argument concluded . . . a week later the Government carried out the commission’s 
death sentence upon six saboteurs, including Haupt. The Court eventually explained 
its reasoning in a written opinion issued several months later.”). 
 202 Cf. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 644 (1947) (upholding the 
conviction a civilian co-conspirator to the conspiracy in Ex parte Quirin for treason by 
giving aid and comfort rather than levying war). 
 203 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality) (Black, J.). 
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uniform or other appropriate means of identification. For that 
reason, even when committed by a citizen, the offense is distinct 
from the crime of treason defined in Article III, § 3 of the 
Constitution, since the absence of uniform essential to one is 
irrelevant to the other.204 
Upon close reading, the Court is applying the rule 
against constructive treasons to two variations of “the crime of 
treason defined in Article III, § 3 of the Constitution”205: the 
addition of the “absence of uniform”206  requirement and the 
subtraction of a citizenship or allegiance requirement. The 
Court found that the addition of a no-uniform requirement was 
an essential element and, “[f]or that reason, even when 
committed by a citizen, the offense is distinct from the crime of 
treason.”207 In fact, the assertion that the offense is not distinct 
from treason “leaves out of account the nature of the offense [of 
unlawful belligerency].” 208  In applying the rule, the Court 
should have focused on the irrelevancy of a uniform element to 
treason rather than the relevancy of it to unlawful belligerency, 
as elements are added to treason in this formulation209: “since 
the absence of uniform essential to [unlawful belligerency] is 
irrelevant to [treason].”210 In essence, therefore, the Court employed 
the additive formulation of the rule against constructive 
treasons and merely misapplied it, rather than contradicting 
the rule.211 
In 1945, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment 
to the rule against constructive treasons in Cramer v. United 
States, further making clear that the Supreme Court did not 
intend to upend the rule against constructive treasons. 212 
Cramer was an appeal from the treason trial of one of Haupt’s 
co-conspirators. Based on the same set of facts and less than 
three years later, the Court again affirmed its commitment to 
the rule against constructive treasons in a significantly deeper 
treatment of the topic than in Quirin.213 It clarified that it did 
 
 204 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-8 (1942) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 205 Id. at 38. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Cf. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125-26 (1807). 
 210 Rosenberg v. United States, 195 F.2d 583, 610-11 (1952). 
 211 See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1952) (“[T]he 
absence of uniform [in Quirin] was an additional element[.]”).  
 212 Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945). 
 213 Id.; see also Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947) (holding that 
Haupt’s father, who never donned a Nazi uniform, was guilty of treason by giving aid 
and comfort). 
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not “intimate that Congress could dispense with . . . [Article III 
protections] by giving the same offense another name.”214 
Additionally, and more directly toward the facts of 
Quirin, there is another, later Supreme Court case about the 
trial of Haupt’s father, Hans, a co-conspirator to the same plot, 
which supports this reading and for the limiting Quirin when 
the exigencies of war disappeared. Hans was convicted at trial 
of treason and appealed.215 The Court’s 1947 case regarding 
that appeal, Haupt v. United States,216 confirms this reading of 
Quirin as a materiality-of-individual-elements analysis 
utilizing the additive formulation. Haupt was an appeal from 
the treason trial of Haupt’s father, Hans, another co-
conspirator. While both father and son were part of the same 
Nazi conspiracy, the father never donned a Nazi uniform—the 
uniform that made the difference between unlawful 
belligerency and treason in Quirin. 
Application of a rule—even with questionable analysis—
cannot be said to signify abandonment of the rule itself. 217 
Therefore, the problem with Quirin is not that the Court has 
abandoned the rule against constructive treasons, but instead 
that the Quirin framework is inapt; similar to how Korematsu—
if still cited today—would be an unsuitable framework for the 
application of strict scrutiny to facial racial classifications. Thus, 
Quirin properly rests within treason law as a Korematsu-like 
wartime aberration. 218 Albeit Quirin is lesser in magnitude, is 
still similarly is not a contradiction of the rule against 
constructive treasons.219 The Court did not reject the restrictive 
rule; it merely applied it incorrectly.220 
The Quirin Court did not need to reach the issue of 
whether the subtraction of either the citizenship or allegiance 
requirement would create a material difference because any 
single material variation makes an offense distinct from 
 
 214 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45. 
 215 Haupt, 330 U.S. at 631. 
 216 Id. at 631. 
 217 E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (applying 
questionable-at-best strict scrutiny to facial racial classifications while not invalidating 
strict scrutiny for facial racial classifications). 
 218 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[Quirin] was not this Court’s finest hour.” (internal citations omitted)); Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing Korematsu as one 
of the worst Supreme Court decisions in history). 
 219 Contra Larson, supra note 24, at 894-900; but see Hurst, supra note 186, at 421. 
 220 The questionable application is similar—albeit lesser in magnitude—to the 
application of strict scrutiny for facial racial classifications in Korematsu. See generally 
Rostow, supra note 198. 
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treason. Rather, the Court seems to assume such a variation 
would create a constructive treason221: the Court’s precedent in 
Wiltberger expressly shows that the recitation of an allegiance 
requirement does not affect the construction of treason.222 
b. The Quirin Problem in the Circuits 
The Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have had 
the occasion to weigh in on the link between terrorism and 
treason by levying war. To date, each court has fallen into the 
first peril. As a result of the Quirin problem, the courts have 
drawn an immaterial distinction between treason and would-be 
constructive treasons. 
In 1952, in United States v. Rosenberg, the Second Circuit 
became the first court to recognize the potential for incongruous 
“inferior court[ ] ” results from and the severe criticism of the 
Quirin decision: 
This ruling has been criticized. But this ruling binds inferior courts 
such as ours. In the Quirin case, the absence of uniform was an 
additional element, essential to [unlawful belligerency] although 
irrelevant to . . . treason; in the Rosenbergs’ case, an essential 
element of treason, giving aid to an ‘enemy,’ is irrelevant to the 
espionage offense. 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he Quirin case had the unavoidable consequence of permitting 
death sentences to be imposed upon the citizen-saboteurs for crimes 
other than treason.223  
The Rosenberg case dealt with the appeal from the 
conviction for the espionage-related offenses of the most infamous 
Soviet atomic spies.224 The Rosenbergs asserted that espionage 
offenses are a constructive treason under the giving aid and 
comfort definition of treason.225 The Rosenberg court’s denial of 
the defense and reasoning would prove to be prescient. 
 
 221 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 38 (1942) (“For that reason, even when 
committed by a citizen, the offense is distinct from the crime of treason defined in 
Article III, § 3 of the Constitution, since the absence of uniform essential to one is 
irrelevant to the other.” (emphasis added)). 
 222 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96-97 (1820). 
 223 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1952) (internal 
citations omitted); see id. at nn. 44-45; see also United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 
132, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1965). 
 224 Rosenberg, 195 F.2d at 588-90, 611; see also Drummond, 354 F.2d at 152-53. 
 225 Rosenberg, 195 F.2d at 588-90, 610; see also Drummond, 354 F.2d at 152-53. 
266 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
In 1986, in United States v. Rodriguez, the Seventh 
Circuit decided the appeal brought by a convicted member of 
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional Puertorriqueña 
(FALN), “an armed clandestine terrorist organization seeking 
independence for Puerto Rico.”226 Rodriguez was convicted of 
seditious conspiracy to levy war for his role in the attempted 
bombing of U.S. military facilities in Chicago.227 The appellant 
challenged the seditious conspiracy statute on the grounds “that 
[it] [was] merely a ‘constructive treason’ statute that dispense[d] 
with the constitutional requirement[s].”228 Comparing seditious 
conspiracy to treason, the court engaged in analysis of what 
“requirements” differed between treason and seditious 
conspiracy, and of the different interests in criminalizing the 
conduct.229 The court held “that [seditious conspiracy] does not 
conflict with the [T]reason [C]lause. [Seditious conspiracy] protects 
a different governmental interest and proscribes a different 
crime.”230 Among other things, the Rodriguez court contended that 
seditious conspiracy lacked an allegiance element.231 The court 
did not clearly decide whether the absence of an allegiance 
element, by itself, would make a material difference because it 
focused on the cumulative differences between the elements of 
treason and seditious conspiracy.232 
In 1999, in United States v. Rahman, the Second Circuit 
affirmed the use of “analogous” sentencing guidelines for 
treason by levying of war when deciding the punishment for 
the participants in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.233 
The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit sedition 
by levying war. 234  The court held that, with respect to the 
constructive treason defense raised,235 “[The] Treason Clause 
does not apply to the prosecution. The [Treason Clause] 
appl[ies] to prosecutions for ‘treason.’” Further, “[The defendants] 
 
 226 United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 319 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. at 320. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 103 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1094 (2000). 
 234 Id at 103. 
 235 Id. at 113 (“Nosair suggests that allegiance to the United States is not an 
element of treason within the contemplation of the Constitution. He concludes that, for 
constitutional purposes, the elements constituting seditious conspiracy by levying war 
and treason by levying war are identical, and consequently that prosecutions for seditious 
conspiracy by levying war must conform to the requirements of the Treason Clause.”). 
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were not charged with treason. Their offense . . . seditious 
conspiracy . . . differs from treason not only in name and 
associated stigma, but also in its essential elements and 
punishment.” 236  The Rahman court reasoned that seditious 
conspiracy is distinct from treason for two primary reasons.237 
First, the seditious conspiracy statute subtracts an allegiance 
element; and second, a seditious alien is less stigmatized in his 
home country than a treasonous citizen.238 The Rahman court, 
however, citing Quirin, noted that “the question [of] whether the 
[Treason] [C]lause applies to offenses that include all the 
elements of treason but are not branded as such” remains open.239 
In 2011, in United States v. Augustin, the Eleventh Circuit 
cited the Second Circuit’s Rahman decision and the Seventh 
Circuit’s Rodriguez decision in denying the appeal of Augustine 
(not Augustin), an al-Qaeda operative. 240  Augustine asserted a 
constructive treason defense during his trial where he was charged 
with providing material support to a terrorist organization.241 The 
Eleventh Circuit noted that “neither . . . statutes under which 
Augustine was convicted—include allegiance to the United States 
as an element of the offense.” Therefore, it had “no trouble 
concluding that these offenses, as defined by Congress, do not fall 
within the ambit of the Treason Clause.”242 
Although the Rodriguez, Rahman, and Augustin courts 
all reached the right result regarding seditious conspiracy, they 
did so by basing their decisions on the wrong premise. While 
they impermissibly focused upon the presence or absence of an 
allegiance requirement—especially because Wiltberger expressly 
proscribes that construction—they ignored the existence of a 
unique, and materially different, element in seditious 
conspiracy: the conspiracy. As explained by the Supreme Court 
in Bollman, conspiracy to levy war is a separate and distinct 
 
 236 Id. at 112 (emphasis added). 
 237 Id. at 112-13. 
 238 Id. at 112-13, n.9 (noting that seditious conspiracy is a “lesser offense,” 
thus, “[w]hether any of the defendants in fact owed allegiance to the United States and 
thus could have been prosecuted for treason if the other requirements to make such a 
prosecution were satisfied is immaterial”). Whether the necessary and sufficient nature 
of the treason definition affects the merging of offenses under the Doctrine of Lesser 
Included Offenses has not been addressed. 
 239 Id. at 113 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38). 
 240 United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1117 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing 
United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); United States 
v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2444 (2012). 
 241 Augustin, 661 F.3d at 1117 (citing Rahman, 189 F.3d at 113; Rodriguez, 
803 F.2d at 320)  
 242 Id. 
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offense from treason because it adds a unique material element: 
conspiracy itself.243 Treason by levying war requires overt acts 
tantamount to levying war, not merely overt acts in furtherance 
of the conspiracy.244 Applying the Bollman reasoning to seditious 
conspiracy produces the same result reached by the Circuits, 
but it does so without the need for an elemental inquiry that 
was performed over 200 years ago.245 
Additionally, the Circuits have fundamentally misapplied 
Wiltberger’s holding regarding the allegiance or citizenship 
requirement of treason. In Wiltberger, Chief Justice Marshall 
compared the treason statute with the misprision (failing to 
report actual knowledge of) of treason statute.246 As Marshall 
noted, “The words . . . ‘owing allegiance to the United States’ [in 
the treason statute] . . . are entirely surplus words, which do not, 
in the slightest degree, affect its sense.”247 The Circuits certainly 
understood the material necessity of allegiance, as discussed in 
Wiltberger,248 but they failed to recognize that a recitation of 
allegiance is neither material nor necessary. Wiltberger held 
that, when comparing the treason statute to another statute, 
the express inclusion of an allegiance element in the treason 
statute has no effect.249 If the allegiance element were omitted 
from the treason statute—such that the language of the statute 
precisely mirrored the constitutional clause—then the flaws in 
the elemental analysis performed by the Second, Seventh, and 
Eleventh Circuits are clear. Therefore, to give effect to 
Wiltberger, courts must construe the treason statute as if 
allegiance were not an element, but rather a mere factual 
precondition necessary for the mens rea.250 The principal idea is 
that a person must owe an allegiance to commit treason, so 
when someone owing an allegiance does what is substantively 
treason, his or her act is treason and not some other crime. 
 
 243 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125-26 (1807). 
 244 Id. 
 245 See id. at 127. Compare 18 U.S.C § 2384 (2012) (seditious conspiracy), with 
18 U.S.C § 2381 (treason). 
 246 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 96-9 (1820). The Court 
reprinted the statutes in question at footnote “a.” Id. at 80 n.a. The language of the 
treason statute is substantially the same except for the possibility of lesser 
punishment. Compare id. (defining the crime of treason in 1820), with 18 U.S.C § 2381 
(modern treason statute). 
 247 Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 97 (interpreting the treason statute, 
which is now codified at 18 U.S.C § 2381). 
 248 E.g., United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting 
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 97) (“‘[T]reason is a breach of allegiance, and can be 
committed by him only who owes allegiance.’”). 
 249 Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 96-97. 
 250 See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. 
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Notwithstanding flaws in their reasoning, each of these 
Circuits—and even the Supreme Court in Quirin—has 
indicated an inclination to engage in the mirroring, additive, 
and subtractive analysis for detecting substantive differences 
between treason and the statute in question. In addition to 
expressly affirming the mirroring formulation in Cramer, the 
Supreme Court used the subtractive formulation in Wiltberger, 
the additive formulation in Bollman, and—questionable result 
aside—in Quirin.251 But without guidance from the Supreme 
Court on how to conduct such analysis, the constructive treason 
defense is doomed because of the Quirin problem. The Seventh 
Circuit analyzed whether the elements of the crime differed from 
that of treason by listing each and every semantic distinction 
that occurred to them, but it failed to consider the materiality of 
those distinctions.252 The Second Circuit began to consider the 
materiality of the differing elements, but, in contradicting 
Wiltberger, it concluded that the lack of an allegiance element in 
the seditious conspiracy statute was an essential distinction 
from treason.253 The Eleventh Circuit compared the elements, 
but stopped its inquiry after noting that seditious conspiracy 
lacked an allegiance requirement, and relied on its sister 
circuits’ decisions on point rather than applying Wiltberger.254 
Thus, the Supreme Court would merely need to synthesize its 
previous rulings into these three coherent formulations to 
resolve the analytical portion of the Quirin problem. 
c. The Solution: “Korematsu” Quirin 
If Korematsu—the first Supreme Court case expressly to 
apply strict scrutiny to facial classifications on the basis of 
race—were considered to be the framework for applying strict 
scrutiny today, a cogent Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence 
would not exist. The similarly aberrant, wartime application of 
the even more well-established rule against constructive 
treasons should not constitute the framework for modern 
application. Giving effect to Wiltberger, Bollman, Cramer, and 
the above formulations of the rule against constructive treason 
would fix the analytical problems faced by the Circuits in 
applying the rule against constructive treasons post-Quirin. But 
 
 251 See supra Part IV.A.1 & note 165. 
 252 United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 253 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 111-13 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
 254 United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1117 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2444 (2012). 
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the uniform issue remains. How may terrorists, like al-Aulaqi, 
who presumably never wear military uniforms, avoid the specific 
holding of Quirin? And are certain acts committed by a citizen 
treasonous only if committed while wearing a uniform?255 
There is one very simple and commonsense way to avoid 
the confusion created by Quirin, at least in the context of 
targeted killing: limit Quirin to its facts. As Judge McMahon 
noted in granting summary judgment for the Government in 
New York Times Co. v. U.S. Department of Justice: 
Both Quirin and Hamdi involved individuals who were in United 
States custody. Quirin remains the lone case upholding the right to 
try a United States citizen before a military commission; it said 
nothing at all about killing a United States citizen without any sort 
of trial. Hamdi addressed the right of a United States citizen 
detained in the United States as an enemy combatant to challenge 
his confinement via habeas corpus. Again, there was no suggestion 
that Mr. Hamdi was to be executed without some kind of trial.256 
Justice Scalia’s Hamdi dissent provides additional 
jurisprudential support for reading Quirin as narrowly holding 
that the Government has a right to exercise military jurisdiction 
over a U.S. citizen in certain, extreme circumstances.257 
Moreover, according to the Quirin court, and on the 
facts before it, a uniform was an “appropriate means of 
identification.”258  Today, however, the Government could not 
claim, with any validity, that the absence of a uniform affects 
its ability to identify al-Aulaqi. The cases of Herbert Haupt and 
Anwar al-Aulaqi arose in very different contexts. Haupt took 
up a uniform in serving Nazi Germany, 259  a well-organized 
enemy with a central government, and was captured on U.S. 
soil.260 Al-Aulaqi never wore a uniform, did not work for an 
enemy that could be described as an effectively organized 
central government, and was stalked by a predator drone in 
 
 255 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942). The Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Hamdi may be read as signaling that it is uncomfortable with the result in Quirin. 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 548-49 (2004) (plurality opinion) (O’Connor, J.) (“Ex 
parte Quirin may perhaps be claimed for the proposition that the American citizenship 
of such a captive does not as such limit the Government’s power to deal with him under 
the usages of war.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); see also id. at 569-72 & n.4 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 256 N.Y. Times Co v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 526 n.13 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 257 Id. at 523 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 
also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 569-72 & n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 258 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38. 
 259 Id. at 21. 
 260 Id. at 21-22. 
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Yemen.261 In Haupt’s case, a Nazi uniform would have helped 
the U.S. government to identify its enemy as he walked along 
the beaches of Long Island and the streets of New York City 
(and in fact an abandoned one did). In al-Aulaqi’s case, by way 
of contrast, the targeted nature of the drone strike262 permits the 
inference that the Government had no trouble identifying al-
Aulaqi, even from the sky, well before striking. Although a 
uniform may assist in the identification of terrorists in some 
cases, in the circumstance of targeted killing, where the 
Government has already identified and located its target, it does 
not. Therefore, Quirin, as well as Hamdi’s reliance on Quirin, is 
inapposite to cases of targeted killing. This line of reasoning is 
particularly damning to the Justice Department’s legal position 
on the matter, as what has been revealed of the government’s 
legal justification relies almost exclusively on Hamdi.263  
B. A Corruption of Blood and Citizen-Terrorist Property 
Interests: Disparate Treatment 
Prosecution under a differently named crime that 
affords the protections of the Treason Clause is a harmless 
constructive treason because the Treason Clause was complied 
with in all but name. 264  That is to say, if a prosecution for 
terrorism was in fact a prosecution for constructive treason, but 
the defendant was afforded the processes due to a traitor, the 
error would be harmless. 265  In al-Aulaqi’s case, there are 
numerous obvious ways that his treatment did not comport with 
the Treason Clause. This section focuses on the one example of 
the disparate treatment between terrorists and traitors: the 
corruption of blood. Rather than being treated as a traitor’s 
assets, al-Aulaqi’s assets were treated as a non-citizen 
terrorist’s assets. 266  They were subject to total forfeiture and 
 
 261 See supra Part II (discussing how al-Aulaqi worked for AQAP, a non-state 
terrorist organization notable for deceptive and nefarious tactics). 
 262 See supra Part II (discussing the precision drone strike that killed al-
Aulaqi). 
 263 See infra note 298. 
 264 United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132, 152 (2d Cir. 1965) (“[I]t is also 
settled that an offense must incorporate all the elements of treason in order for the 
two-witness rule to apply.”); see United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 111-13 (2d Cir. 
1999) (per curiam) (“[The defendant’s] conviction was not supported by two witnesses 
to the same overt act. Accordingly the conviction must be overturned if the requirement 
of the Treason Clause applies to this prosecution.”); see also United States v. 
Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1952). 
 265 Cf. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 111-13. 
 266 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G) (2012); Al-Aulaqi Designation, supra note 101, 
at 43233-34. 
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seizure by order of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.267 In 
light of Van Riswick, and because al-Aulaqi is properly 
characterized as a traitor, those assets must divest completely 
from the Government and pass on to al-Aulaqi’s successors in 
interest.268 If any assets seized pursuant to al-Aulaqi’s designation 
as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, or forfeited under 18 
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G),269 have not yet divested completely from the 
Government, then the bar against corruptions of blood is violated. 
Incidentally, this particular form of asset protection 
provides relief for the standing issue that predicated the 
dismissal in al-Aulaqi v. Obama.270 By creating an injury in fact 
to al-Aulaqi’s estate (unlawful seizure of Anwar’s assets under 
Treasury Department terrorism procedures), the government 
thus confers third-party standing on the executor.271 Further, 
the petitioners in al-Aulaqi v. Panetta employed executory 
interest as the basis for standing; the ACLU asserts standing 
for Nasser al-Aulaqi not as father, but as executor.272 If Nasser 
al-Aulaqi is able to demonstrate his credentials as executor, 
then the case will likely address the merits of the case.273  
C. Remedy for Violations of a Citizen’s Treason Clause Rights 
Courts have treated failure to abide by the Treason 
Clause as structural error, which demands automatic reversal 
on appeal without a showing of prejudice.274 However, there are 
 
 267 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G); Al-Aulaqi Designation, supra note 101, at 43233-01. 
 268 Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 209 (1875). 
 269 § 981(a)(1)(G) (providing that all of a terrorist’s assets, real or personal, 
foreign or domestic, are subject to forfeiture). 
 270 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 28, 30 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 271 Judge Bates hinted that the ACLU may be able to surmount the standing 
issue by asserting official executory interest. See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 25-26 
(citing Saunders v. Air Florida, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D.D.C. 1983) (“The D.C. 
wrongful death statute does not provide a basis for plaintiff ’ s alleged legally protected 
interest in preserving his relationship with his adult son, as it only protects persons 
who are ‘officially appointed executors or administrators of the child’s estate’. . . . There 
is no evidence in the record to suggest that plaintiff is the ‘executor or administrator’ of 
Anwar Al-Aulaqi’s estate, and the Court is aware of no other possible statutory basis 
for plaintiff ’ s alleged legally protected interest.”)). 
 272 Panetta Complaint, supra note 20, at ¶ 6. 
 273 Defs. Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 1:12-cv-01192-RMC 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (contesting standing on the narrow grounds that plaintiffs “failed to 
properly alleg[e]” that they are “decedents’ personal [estate] representatives” because 
the plaintiffs must have previously “file[d] with the Register a copy of the appointment 
as personal representative.”). 
 274 See United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2010) (defining a 
structural error); cf. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 181 (Marshall, Circuit 
Justice, C.C.D. Va., 1807) (No. 14692a) (dismissing a High Treason charge against 
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valid arguments for a different standard of review. The 
guarantees of the Treason Clause have never been subjected to a 
standard of review such as those employed in due process or 
equal protection cases. The Supreme Court has never addressed 
the question of whether all violations require immediate 
reversal or if there may be circumstances in which a state’s 
interests outweigh the harm of the deprivation. 
Supreme Court precedent indicates that automatic 
reversal results from the deprivation of any of the procedural 
protections afforded by the Treason Clause. In United States v. 
Burr, Justice Marshall dismissed the High Treason charge 
against Aaron Burr because, as an evidentiary matter, the 
Government had not provided two witnesses to the same overt 
treasonous act. 275  Hundreds of years later, in Rahman, the 
Second Circuit stated that “[i]t is undisputed that [the 
defendant]’s conviction was not supported by two witnesses to 
the same overt act. Accordingly, the conviction must be 
overturned if the requirement of the Treason Clause applies to 
this prosecution for seditious conspiracy.”276 
The Judiciary is responsible for ensuring that the 
Government does not abuse its power by declaring a person an 
enemy of the state in order to suppress that person’s political 
activities.277 The procedural protections in the Treason Clause 
do not exist simply to make prosecution more challenging. 
Rather, they exist to safeguard against improper accusations, 
which would be manifest miscarriages of justice were they 
brought to trial. A court can tell the difference between a 
treason prosecution for the purpose of suppressing minority 
political activity and one to address a security threat without 
 
Aaron Burr as there were no two witnesses to the same overt act); see also United 
States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 112 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
 275 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 13 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va., 1807) (No. 
14692a) (“[Treason] . . . must be proved by two witnesses . . . . Under the control of this 
constitutional regulation, I am to inquire whether the testimony laid before me 
furnishes probable cause in support of this charge.”); see also United States v. Burr, 25 
F. Cas. 55, 180 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va., 1807) (No. 14693) (“This opinion 
does not comprehend the proof by two witnesses . . . .”). 
 276 Rahman, 189 F.3d at 112. 
 277 The matter that concerned the Founding Fathers was really the use of 
treason convictions by political factions to “[wreak] alternate malignity on each other.” 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 29. For example, if al-Aulaqi were not in any way 
related to the operations of AQAP and publically spoke as a cleric against policies of 
the United States, then his actions wouldn’t be treason by levying war, but likely 
political speech covered by the First Amendment. But cf. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444, 449-50 (1969). Depending on the specific content of the speech, however, if it 
“incite[d] his listeners to imminent lawless action,” it would forfeit First Amendment 
protection. Id. 
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entering into deep and exhaustive inquiry. Where the 
government kills traitors without process to address a clear, 
imminent security threat, no such miscarriage exists, and 
procedural defects should be subject to less stringent review. 
D. Treason Clause Externalities: A Brief Discussion of the 
Effect of Article III, Section iii on the Political Question 
Doctrine 
A court scrutinizing the Government action in al-Aulaqi 
v. Obama would need to determine if al-Aulaqi was a military 
threat. This turns on the question of how a court could qualify 
a threat to determine the appropriateness of the responding 
force. 278  As the judge in al-Aulaqi v. Obama held, such an 
inquiry is the traditional hallmark of a non-justiciable political 
question. 279  But some commentators have argued that it is 
not.280 The application of the political question doctrine in al-
Aulaqi v. Obama was mere dicta: the court had already held 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing and it did not need to reach 
the issue of political question nonjusticiability.281 Nevertheless, 
with respect to a constructive treason defense, consideration of 
two of the six factors considered in political question 
jurisprudence—a textually demonstrable commitment to a 
coordinate branch of the Government, and the lack of a judicially 
manageable standard of determination—is informative as the 
analysis of these factors changes significantly when the Treason 
Clause comes into play.282 
The Judiciary is not allowed to intrude upon issues 
where there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a 
 
 278 Ex ante determinations on the appropriateness of military decisions like 
this this traditionally have been relegated to the realm of non-justiciable political 
questions. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46-47 (D.D.C. 2010). The 
Court, however, has clearly signaled that it will entertain challenges to actions under 
the war power. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 279 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47. 
 280 E.g., Dehn & Heller, supra note 8. 
 281 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (standing); id. at 52 (justiciability). 
 282 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (plurality opinion) (“Prominent on 
the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements 
by various departments on one question.”). 
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coordinate branch of government because “[t]he nonjusticiability 
of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of 
powers.”283 The fact that the Treason Clause appears in Article 
III, and not Article I or II, reveals no such textual commitment. 
Rather, it represents a textually demonstrable commitment to 
the Judiciary to administer treason law.284 Thus, the al-Aulaqi 
court’s reliance on the textual delegation of foreign affairs and 
war-making authority to the Executive and Congress285 would 
be inapposite in a Treason Clause challenge. 
While such an interpretation may seem overly textual, 
the Government, in moving to dismiss the al-Aulaqi v. Panetta 
suit, used a parallel reading. The ACLU complaint alleged that 
“[the Government’s] actions constituted an unconstitutional act 
of attainder because [the Government] designated Anwar Al-
Aulaqi for death without the protections of a judicial 
trial . . . .”286 Bills of attainder are always unconstitutional under 
Article I.287 The Government asserts that “the Bill of Attainder 
Clause applies to bills: legislative acts—not executive ones” 
because “[the] clause is found in Article I of the Constitution, the 
article addressing the powers of Congress.”288 The Government’s 
position is correct insofar as Supreme Court jurisprudence 
states, attainders are a “category of Congressional actions 
which the Constitution barred.”289 However, if the court accepts 
the Government’s textual argument that the prohibition on 
attainders does not apply to the Executive because of its 
placement in Article I, then it must analogously construe the 
Treason Clause’s judicial restrictions and responsibilities.  
Further, the CIA Counterterrorism Center legal team 
has created a “judicially discoverable and manageable 
standard.”290 “These [counterterrorism] operations are conducted in 
strict accordance with American law and are governed by legal 
 
 283 Baker, 369 U.S. at 210. 
 284 See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing separation of powers); see also N.Y. Times 
Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing the 
separation of powers regarding treason law and the role of the judiciary). 
 285 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 47-48. 
 286 Panetta Complaint, supra note 20 at ¶ 43. 
 287 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 9 cl. 3. The Government’s motion to dismiss also 
asserts several cases to support its proposition. 
 288 Defs. Motion to Diss. at 44-45, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 1:12-cv-01192-RMC 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 289 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) (emphasis added); see 
also Paradissiotis v. Rubin, 171 F.3d 983, 988 (5th Cir. 1999); Global Relief Found., Inc. 
v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 755 (7th Cir. 2002); Walmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 52 F.3d 
851, 855 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 290 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see supra Part V.A.2.a (describing 
the trial-like adjudication by the CIA). 
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guidance provided by the Department of Justice.”291 Thus, the basis 
for CIA adjudication and approval of citizen-terrorists for lethal 
operation is a “legalistic and carefully argued” analysis.292 
In fact, in February 2013, the Department of Justice 
released a presumably redacted version of its “al-Aulaqi White 
Paper,” 293  which provides the previously classified 294  “legal 
framework for considering the circumstances in which the U.S. 
government could use lethal force in a foreign country outside 
the area of active hostilities . . . against a U.S. citizen who is a 
senior operational leader of . . . an associated force of al-Qa’ida.”295 
The standard is a three-part inquiry, and asks whether: 
(1) an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has 
determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of 
violent attack against the United States; (2) capture is infeasible, 
and the United States continues to monitor whether capture 
becomes feasible; (3) the operation would be conducted in a manner 
consistent with the applicable law of war principles.296 
 
 291 McKlevey, supra note 16. 
 292 Id. 
 293 A.k.a, “the drone memo,” “the al-Qulaqi white papers,” etc. Many names have 
been used to refer to this DOJ unsigned white paper in the press and in scholarship. See, 
e.g., Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-memo-
made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 294 Obviously, the white paper has been at least partially declassified. Judge 
McMahon’s finding in N.Y. Times Co. that the Government had not waived the 
classified status of the entire “al-Aulaqi White Paper” because, with respect to the 
public disclosures by Attorney General Holder that would have been the basis for such 
a waiver, N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp.2d 508, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (citing Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech at the Northwestern University 
School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012)), was based on such disclosure being “a far cry from a 
legal research memorandum.” Id. It is no longer the case that the Obama 
Administration’s disclosures on that topic are a far cry, but are in fact exactly such a 
memorandum, which purportedly “reveal[s] the exact legal reasoning behind the 
Government’s conclusion that its actions comply with domestic and international law.” 
Id. at 536-37 & n.29. See generally DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER: LAWFULNESS OF A 
LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL 
LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 1 (2013). Therefore, the rest of the 
White Paper, Savage, supra note 293 (describing the document as approximately fifty 
pages), might discuss the Government position on the Treason Clause and has been a 
change in circumstances which may demand a change in Judge McMahon’s findings 
and compel full publication. Cf. N.Y. Times Co., 915 F. Supp.2d at 535-36 (citing 
Halpern v. F.B.I., 181 F.3d 279, 294 (2d Cir. 1999)); Public Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 11 
F.3d 198, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 880 F. Supp. 
145, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held 
contrary to Judge McMahon. See generally ACLU v. CIA, No. 11–5320, 2013 WL 
1003688 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 2013) (Garland, C.J.). 
 295 AL-AULAQI WHITE PAPER, supra note 294, at 1. 
 296 Id. at 1, 6. 
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Hence, the al-Aulaqi holding that no such standard is 
intelligibly discernible297 is in error.298 It strains all credulity to 
believe that the CIA lawyers and the Department of Justice are 
more capable than a court in applying an “extremely robust”299 
rule with “a solid legal foundation” to determine if a citizen 
should die300 for acts that may be constitutionally punished only 
if the Judiciary has discharged its Article III responsibility. It is 
particularly true that courts are more capable when the 
standard is “[b]ased on generations-old legal principles and 
Supreme Court decisions handed down since WWII, as well as 
during this current [War on Terror].”301 
Therefore, with respect to the essential inquiry of the 
political question doctrine—the textually demonstrable 
commitment that separates a power from coordinate branches of 
government—the assertion of a constructive treason defense in al-
Aulaqi-type cases allocates the Government’s responsibility of 
administering treason law to the Judiciary, rather than either the 
 
 297 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 47 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 298 See N.Y. Times Co., 915 F. Supp. 2d at 525-26 & nn.13, 15 (describing the 
well-developed standard). However, there is an obvious flaw in the Government’s 
standard: the reliance on Hamdi alone as a jurisprudential basis for the framework. 
AL-AULAQI WHITE PAPER, supra note 294, at 6 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 
534-35 (2004) (plurality opinion)). As Judge McMahon in the Southern District of New 
York notes, the Hamdi and al-Aulaqi cases are readily distinguishable: “Hamdi 
addressed the right of a United States citizen . . . to challenge his confinement . . . there 
was no suggestion that Mr. Hamdi was to be executed without some kind of trial.” N.Y. 
Times Co., 915 F. Supp.2d at 526 n.13. Or, as the government states in the Panetta 
legislation, “Hamdi involved the habeas claim of a U.S. citizen challenging his military 
detention in the United States, a context wholly distinct from the alleged use of lethal 
force abroad to target a leader of an armed enemy group.” Defs. Reply Brief at 6, Al-
Aulaqi v. Panetta, 1:12-cv-01192-RMC (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Thus, the 
standard relies on a case decided in a significantly different context, where the right to 
life was not at issue in the Mathews balancing performed by the Court. Hamdi, 542 
U.S. at 534-35. The larger issue is that this standard, while being touted as “extremely 
robust” and “[b]ased on generations-old legal principles and Supreme Court decisions 
handed down during WWII, as well as during this current conflict,” relies erroneously 
on Hamdi and Quirin. See New York Times Co., 915 F. Supp.2d at 525 n.15. Either the 
standard is developed enough where some manageable legal standard exists for 
making for these sorts of determinations, or the determinations are arbitrary and 
capricious actions, which would fail even rational basis review, and which even more 
strongly demands judicial intervention to grant relief to citizens being deprived of their 
right to life by unconstitutional state action. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying 
text (discussing this footnote).  
 299 N.Y. Times Co., 915 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (quoting Harold Koh, State 
Department Legal Advisor, Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law in Washington, DC. (Mar. 25, 2012), available at http://www.cfr.org/ 
international–law/legal–adviser–kohs–speech–obamaadministration–international–law–
march–2010/p22300). 
 300 McKlevey, supra note 16. 
 301 N.Y. Times Co., 508 F. Supp. 2d at 527 (quoting Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y 
Gen., Speech at the Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012)). 
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Executive or Congress. Further, there is a judicially manageable 
standard by which a court may do so. 
V. THE SECOND PERIL: THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
Even if a court reviewing an al-Aulaqi-like case avoids 
the first peril, it must ensure that its treatment of the 
defendant does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
Because there is no substantial difference between treason by 
levying war and terrorism when committed by a U.S. citizen; 
the two crimes are intrinsically the same offense within the 
meaning of Skinner. 302  Thus, the Government has made an 
“invidious . . . discrimination” that must pass strict scrutiny if 
it “lays an unequal hand” on the two classes of offenders.303 
A. Lays An Unequal Hand: Different Treatment of Citizen-
Terrorists and Traitors with Respect to Legal Process 
and Access to the Judiciary 
A comparison of the legal protections afforded to 
terrorists and traitors reveals significant differences with 
respect to the legal process provided prior to a determination to 
end the individual’s life, and with respect to access to the 
Judiciary. One’s status as either a traitor or terrorist will 
shape the accused’s access to the courts and legal process. 
1. The Right to Life 
Many commentators have discussed the unprecedented 
nature of the al-Aulaqi killing with respect to his right to life, 
albeit not in an equal protection context.304 Yet the fact remains 
that no other criminal in the United States has ever been 
sentenced to death by drone without a trial. 
Although the federal statute for treason prescribes a 
sentence of death,305  it also gives significant latitude to the 
sentencing judge. This latitude permits that the traitor “be 
imprisoned not less than five years and fined . . . not less than 
$10,000.” 306  By contrast, the terrorism statute mandates a 
sentence much less severe than capital punishment.307 Thus,  
 302 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 303 Id. 
 304 See supra note 24. 
 305 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012). 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. § 2332b(g)(5); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c). 
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had al-Aulaqi been tried before an Article III court and found 
guilty of treason, he could have had a chance to plea for a 
lesser sentence than the one the CIA imposed. Additionally, 
and perversely, had al-Aulaqi been found guilty of treason, the 
court would have had a stronger constitutional basis for 
imposing a death sentence. 
2. Access to the Judicial System 
The availability of these alternative punishments, 
however, presupposes access to the courts. Accused traitors are 
given the full rights of any person accused of a capital offense 
in a federal prosecution,308 such as the right to a jury trial309 
and the right to appeal. 310  Additionally, the accused would 
benefit from the special requirements of treason prosecutions: 
its evidentiary requirement and its prohibition on corruptions 
of blood.311 The Supreme Court has vigilantly protected these 
treason rights, so to speak, since the early founding of the 
Republic.312 When a terrorist target like al-Aulaqi is approved 
for a lethal operation, he or she likely will be executed. That is 
to say, terrorists may be killed without trial or appeal,313 but 
traitors may not be killed without either. 
a. Trial by the CIA Rather Than by Jury 
In Ex parte Bollman, the Supreme Court determined 
that the question of whether an accused traitor has levied war 
is a matter of fact for a jury to decide.314 In al-Aulaqi’s case, the 
determination that he was a terrorist who deserved death came 
from a different source: the CIA.315 In such circumstances, the 
 
 308 E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting, among other things, the right to 
confront witnesses); 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (providing for the right to counsel in federal 
capital cases). 
 309 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, amend. VI; see also Baldwin v. New York, 399 
U.S. 117, 119-20 (1970) (“[T]he federal right to jury trial attaches where an offense is 
punishable by as much as six months imprisonment. I think this follows both from the 
breadth of the language of the Sixth Amendment, which provides for a jury in ‘all 
criminal prosecutions,’ and the evidence of historical practice.”). Treason, being 
punishable by a minimum of five years and a maximum of death, clearly has the right 
to a jury trial attached. 18 U.S.C. § 2381. 
 310 18 U.S.C. § 3732; Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(1). 
 311 U.S. CONST. art III, § 3. 
 312 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 313 See generally, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 314 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 118 (1807) (“[It] [i]s impossible to 
define what should in every case be deemed a levying of war. It is a question of fact to 
be decided by the jury from all the circumstances.”). 
 315 Miller, supra note 110. 
280 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
CIA is not making a routine administrative decision; it is 
conducting a trial-like adjudication.316 Even where an agency, 
rather than a court, makes a determination, some due process 
rights attach. Where “a relatively small number of persons [is] 
concerned, who [are] exceptionally affected [by the agency 
action at issue], in each case upon individual grounds,” a 
hearing is required.317 
An individual must meet the CIA’s legal standard to be 
classified as a terrorist subject to targeted killing.318 Pursuant 
to a secret 50-page Department of Justice white paper 
outlining the terrorist classification process,319 approximately 
10 CIA Counterterrorism Center attorneys receive a “‘two page 
document,’ along with ‘an appendix with supporting information, 
if anybody want[s] to read all of it.’” 320  The attorneys then 
prepare a “cable” that “often run[s] up to five pages.”321 Senior 
attorneys will review the cable for errors, such as if “‘the 
justification in approving a person for lethal operation] would 
be that the person was thought to be at a meeting [but was 
not].’”322 The cable is then sent to the CIA’s General Counsel for 
approval.323 At any given time, there are about 30 individuals 
approved for targeting.324 
The CIA determined that al-Aulaqi was an appropriate 
target of a lethal operation because he was the “leader of 
external operations”325 in AQAP, and, accordingly, he was a 
terrorist and a military threat. 326  It is undisputed that al-
 
 316 Dreyfuss, supra note 24 (“When an agency makes a binding decision on the 
rights of a particular party by reference to historical facts, it is conducting an 
adjudication.” (citations omitted)). 
 317 Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915). 
Undoubtedly, a single person facing the prospect of death by Hellfire missile would be a 
sufficiently small number of persons: to say that he would be exceptionally affected by 
the adjudication is an understatement. 
 318 McKlevey, supra note 16. For the purposes of this note, we will assume 
that al-Aulaqi was subject to these standards, albeit that the relevant action was the 
final determination by the Obama Administration. Islamist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki killed 
in Yemen, B.B.C. NEWS (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
15121879. 
 319 McKlevey, supra note 16. 
 320 Id. (quoting John A. Rizzo). 
 321 Id. 
 322 Id. 
 323 Id. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Mazzetti et al., supra note 3, at A1 (quoting President Obama). 
 326 According to Scott Shane, the Government’s legal basis for lethal 
operations approval is as follows: 
First, he posed an imminent threat to the lives of Americans, having 
participated in plots to blow up a Detroit-bound airliner in 2009 and to bomb 
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Aulaqi levied war.327 His actions conformed to the definition of 
treason: he assembled with others to commit overt acts to 
usurp the Government’s authority for non-private motives; and 
importantly, he was a citizen who owed allegiance to—and 
therefore betrayed—the United States.328 Thus, because he was 
a traitor, his guilt and punishment were questions for a jury, 
not for the President and his men.329 
b. Equal Access to Appellate Courts 
The right to appeal for indigent classes is protected by 
the Equal Protection Clause.330 In Douglas v. California, the 
Supreme Court held that a state cannot invidiously discriminate 
by providing different appellate processes to protected classes.331 
In Douglas, the discriminatory classification at issue was the 
more mundane classification of wealth.332 In al-Aulaqi’s case, the 
different treatment between citizen-terrorists and traitors is a 
product of invidious discrimination between two classes of 
alleged criminals who committed intrinsically the same 
 
two cargo planes last year. Second, he was fighting alongside the enemy in 
the armed conflict with Al Qaeda. And finally, in the chaos of Yemen, there 
was no feasible way to arrest him. 
Scott Shane, Judging a Long, Deadly Reach, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/american-strike-on-american-target-revives-
contentious-constitutional-issue.html#, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1. 
The fact that al-Aulaqi was also targeted because of the infeasibility of arrest and 
immanency of the threat will be discussed later, this note assumes those fact to be true, 
but the merits of them are not relevant to this portion of the analysis. See infra Part 
V.B (applying strict scrutiny).  
  Further, the DOJ in al-Aulaqi v. Obama used the President’s military and 
commander-in-chief powers as the basis for asserting that the case fell within the 
ambit of the political question doctrine. Opposition to Plaintiff ’ s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
at 19, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 1:10-cv-01469). 
 327 See supra Part II (describing how al-Aulaqi called for jihad against the 
United States, encouraged and assisted in the operations of a terrorist organization 
that has claimed responsibility for attacking the United States); see also Dreyfuss, 
supra note 24, at 269-70 (stating that al-Aulaqi had levied war). 
 328 See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 97 (1820) (“Treason 
is a breach of allegiance, and can be committed by him only who owes allegiance . . . .”); 
cf. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 29 (1945) (“[I]f there is no intent to betray, 
there is no treason.”). 
 329 The Treason Clause was meant to restrict the powers of the individual 
government branches with respect to the handling of traitors, not permit the executive 
to sit as judge, jury, and executioner. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 24, at 1205-06. 
 330 E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that indignant 
petitioners who are denied free trial transcripts are discriminated against on the basis 
of wealth in terms of their right to an appeal). 
 331 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963); see also Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19. 
 332 372 U.S. at 357-58; see also Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19. 
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offense, 333  resulting in different treatment with respect to 
appeals as a matter of right. 
The President takes the position that he may order 
killings of citizen-terrorists, a stance that is not subject to 
judicial review under the political question and state secrets 
doctrines.334 In al-Aulaqi v. Obama,335 the presiding judge noted 
that it is constitutionally peculiar that executive decisions 
regarding wiretapping citizens abroad were subject to judicial 
review, but what were effectively kill warrants were not.336 The 
judge ultimately agreed that the issuance of kill warrants is an 
unreviewable political question.337 
Additionally, the judge accepted the Government’s 
claims that al-Aulaqi, or a person in a similar situation, could 
avail himself of the courts, for example, by peaceably 
surrendering at an embassy.338 This claim, however, presumes 
two things. First, it presumes that there is a matter over which 
to surrender. While al-Aulaqi was clearly a traitor, he was never 
charged with any “terrorism-related crimes”339 or treason. The 
Government’s position here begs the question: why would al-
Aulaqi surrender on non-existent charges in order to appear in 
court?340 The lack of a criminal indictment and the secret nature 
of the CIA kill list341 negates any possibility that al-Aulaqi could 
have received notice of the specific crimes or terrorist attacks for 
which he was expected to surrender and stand trial. 
Second, the Government’s claim that al-Aulaqi could 
have accessed courts presumes that surrender presents itself 
as a realistic option. The Government’s position, as accepted by 
the court, essentially would have required al-Aulaqi to travel to 
the U.S. embassy in Yemen. Likely possessing invaluable 
information about his associates’ international criminal 
conspiracy of terror, al-Aulaqi would have had to betray and 
evade the murderous AQAP members, comrades that had kept 
 
 333 See supra Part III.C. 
 334 Opposition to Plaintiff ’ s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at II, V, Al-Aulaqi v. 
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 1:10-cv-01469) (Dep’t. of Justice). 
 335 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 336 Id. at 8. 
 337 Id. at 46. 
 338 Id. at 17-18. 
 339 Al-Aulaqi Complaint, supra note 13 at ¶ 24. 
 340 Which, the ACLU properly recognized. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 18 
(citing Pl.’s Opp. at 9) (arguing that deciding that al-Aulaqi needs to avail himself of 
the judicial system decides the Government’s contention that “‘[al-Aulaqi was at the 
time] a participant in an armed conflict against the United States.’”). 
 341 Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 273. 
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him and that information safe from the Yemeni authorities.342 He 
would have needed to travel through Yemen when he was wanted 
for a crime for which he was sentenced in absentia.343 And, he 
would have needed to do all of this while evading the freely 
flying predator drone force of the U.S. government. 344 
Essentially, al-Aulaqi was facing the same choice of Ben 
Richards, the protagonist of The Running Man.345  
Although some of these considerations are unique to al-
Aulaqi’s case, and will not apply to all citizen-terrorists, the 
first presumption stands as a legal point independently of the 
second. If the Government adopts some form of notice system, 
the second consideration must be at least examined when 
discussing the concept of surrender. Thus, with respect to Al-
Aulaqi, the court erred in holding that “[a]ll U.S. citizens may 
avail themselves of the U.S. judicial system if they present 
themselves peacefully, and no U.S. citizen may simultaneously 
avail himself of the U.S. judicial system and evade U.S. law 
enforcement authorities.”346 
Further, and most importantly, the judge did not realize 
the full implication of his conclusions that the targeting of al-
Aulaqi was a political question. 347  As John C. Dehn notes, 
“[t]argeted individuals thus might turn themselves in only to 
find their status [as targeted for death] unreviewable as 
a political question.”348 The surrender option thus guarantees 
no actual judicial relief to the Running Man conundrum under 
al-Aulaqi v. Obama. 
 
 342 See, e.g., Savage, supra note 294. Al-Aulaqi evaded Yemeni commando 
authorities for some time with the assistance of his terrorist associates. Id. 
 343 See supra note 97. 
 344 The U.S. has permission from Yemen to patrol with drones. Savage, supra 
note 294. 
 345 See generally RICHARD BACHMAN, THE RUNNING MAN (1982). Ben Richards 
competes in a game show, The Running Man, ostensibly to make some money for his 
family. Id. The object of The Running Man is to survive: the participant is declared an 
enemy of the U.S. government and elite hit men are sent to kill him in a thirty-day 
worldwide excursion. Id. Richard Bachman is a pen name for Stephen King. 
 346 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 18. 
 347 Id. at 46. 
 348 Dehn & Heller, supra note 8, at 185; accord Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp.2d at 
46 (“Judicial resolution of the ‘particular questions posed by plaintiff in this case would 
require this Court to decide: . . . whether there are ‘means short of lethal force’ that the 
United States could ‘reasonably’ employ to address any threat that Anwar Al-Aulaqi 
poses to U.S. national security interests . . . it becomes clear that plaintiff ’ s claims pose 
precisely the types of complex policy questions that the D.C. Circuit has historically 
held non-justiciable under the political question doctrine.” (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted)); see also id. at 52 (discussing the court’s lack of capacity). Cognizing any real 
limitation on the Government’s power to deal with “any threat,” id., posed by an 
individual infamous for devious and treacherous suicide bombing attempts seems to be 
an impossible task. 
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Consequently, although the Constitution guarantees 
traitors more than a full spectrum of rights, citizen-terrorists 
do not equally enjoy the right to a jury trial or an appeal of their 
capital sentence. Furthermore, and more troubling, in the sole 
case to consider questions about the rights of those determined 
to be CIA targets, the D.C. district court shielded this invidious 
discrimination349 behind the political question doctrine. Therefore, 
the Government has made, and a court has sanctioned “as an 
invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race 
or nationality for oppressive treatment” and has “la[id] an 
unequal hand” upon al-Aulaqi.350 
B. Strict Scrutiny Applied 
As in any circumstance where an invidious 
discrimination is present, the Government’s differential 
treatment of two classes of criminals who have committed 
intrinsically the same offense must be “[narrowly] tailored to 
serve a compelling governmental interest.”351  
While the general rule in criminal law is that “what charge 
to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest 
in the prosecutor’s discretion,” and that “a defendant has no 
constitutional right to elect which of two applicable federal statutes 
shall be the basis of his indictment and prosecution,”352 that rule is 
inapposite in treason cases. The Drafters of the Constitution 
specifically wrote the Clause to circumscribe the state’s discretion 
in even creating crimes that encroach on the gravamen of the 
offense of treason. Thus, prosecutorial and legislative discretion is 
uniquely at constitutional ebb when the Treason Clause comes into 
play, as it is exactly the state’s almost unbridled discretion in 
criminal prosecution that the Founder’s feared. 
1. The Compelling Governmental Interest: National 
Security 
The Supreme Court has declared that the Government, 
and specifically the Executive, has a compelling interest in 
 
 349 See supra Part III.A. 
 350 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 351 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982). 
 352 United States v. Batchelder, 442 US 114, 115 (1979). 
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preventing acts tantamount to levying war against the United 
States.353 In Korematsu v. United States, the Court noted: 
[H]ardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships. 
All citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of war 
in greater or lesser measure. Citizenship has its responsibilities as 
well as its privileges, and in time of war the burden is always 
heavier. Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their 
homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is 
inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions. But when 
under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by 
hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the 
threatened danger.354 
While a court considering the facts of Korematsu would 
undoubtedly reach a different result today,355 the principle of 
the case stands: when the Government is claiming its war 
powers justify an action, even an action “inconsistent with our 
basic governmental institutions,”356 that action is constitutionally 
permissible under strict scrutiny so long as it is proportional to 
the threat.357 
The Skinner equal protection analysis tends to allow the 
Government significant “play in its joints.”358 However, in United 
States v. Robel, the Supreme Court signaled that “the phrase ‘war 
power’ cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support 
any exercise of . . . power which can be brought within its ambit. 
‘[E]ven the war power does not remove constitutional 
limitations safeguarding essential liberties.’” 359  Although the 
Robel Court was discussing congressional war powers and not 
executive war powers, it would be absurd to claim that even  
 353 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-20 (1944) (citing Executive 
Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407) (“[T]he successful prosecution of the war requires 
every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense 
material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities.”); see also 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943). 
 354 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-20 (applying strict scrutiny to the question of 
whether, under its war powers, the Government, based on race alone, may inter the 
entire population of West Coast Japanese-Americans during WWII). 
 355 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 199 at 715 n.45 and accompanying text 
(citing Rostow, supra note 198) (“Korematsu is objectionable because the government 
used race alone as the basis for predicting who was a threat to national security and 
who would remain free.”). 
 356 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220. 
 357 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (permitting 
infringements on free expression under Congress’ war power, but “no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest”). 
 358 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540 (quoting Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 
501 (1931) (Holmes, J.)). 
 359 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (internal citations 
omitted) (alteration in original) (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 
398, 426 (1934)). 
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though Congress’ war powers are limited, the Executive may 
use its powers as a talismanic incantation to eviscerate the 
Constitution of all legal protections. Thus, the fact that the 
Government invoked the Executive’s war powers under the 
AUMF and the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers in al-
Aulaqi v. Obama 360  does not foreclose the consideration of 
whether a compelling government interest exists to justify the 
killing of al-Aulaqi. 
Al-Aulaqi constituted a perpetual terrorist threat 
between the time he became a leader in AQAP in 2007, and his 
execution in 2011. During the period where al-Aulaqi was 
“leader of external operations [for AQAP],”361 he was linked to 
over a dozen terrorist plots or treasonable designs and their 
overt acts—such as the Fort Hood Massacre, the Times Square 
Bomber, and the 2009 Christmas Day Bomber. 362  He was 
especially dangerous because of his intimate knowledge of U.S. 
culture and his ability to reach a widespread, English-speaking 
audience.363 Therefore, under a deferential standard of review 
and assuming facts favorable to the government, al-Aulaqi 
could be considered a continuing threat to the security of the 
United States that created a compelling government interest in 
his elimination. A drone is not much different than a bomb in 
terms of its effect and, thus, its proportionality. 
 
 360 Opposition to Plaintiff ’ s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, V, Al-Aulaqi v. 
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 1:10-cv-01469) (“More broadly, the 
Complaint seeks judicial oversight of the President’s power to use force overseas to 
protect the Nation from the threat of attacks by an organization against which the 
political branches have authorized the use of all necessary and appropriate force, in 
compliance with applicable domestic and international legal requirements, including 
the laws of war. See Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107 
40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (Joint Resolution of Congress signed by the President). In 
addition to the AUMF, there are other legal bases under U.S. and international law for 
the President to authorize the use of force against al-Qaeda and AQAP, including the 
inherent right to national self-defense recognized in international law (see, e.g., United 
Nations Charter Article 51). Plaintiff asks the Court to issue ex ante commands to the 
President and his military and intelligence advisors about how to exercise this 
authority [as commander-in-chief] . . . .”). 
 361 Mazzetti et al., supra note 3, at A1 (quoting President Obama), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-
yemen.html?pagewanted=all. 
 362 See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (detailing al-Aulaqi’s 
terrorist career). 
 363 Kannof, supra note 24, at 1381 (2011). 
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2. Narrowly Tailored 
As commentators have observed, al-Aulaqi was targeted 
because “there was no feasible way to arrest him” and because 
“he posed an imminent threat to the lives of Americans.” 364 
Therefore, and in light of the increased deference shown by the 
courts to the Executive in times of war,365 issuing a kill order 
would likely be found a narrowly tailored action. Additionally, 
the manner in which the kill order was executed was 
appropriately narrowly tailored; there is hardly a more precise 
and exact killing machine than a predator drone.366 Because the 
asserted government interest was elimination of a security 
threat,367 the Government initiated a specific military response 
to completely eliminate the threat.368 
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution discriminates between citizens and 
non-citizens who levy war against the United States by giving a 
restrictive yet exhaustive definition of treason. The defined 
crime may only be committed by citizens and entitles only 
citizens to specific due process protections.369 The Constitution 
strips from Congress and the Executive the power to define the 
crime of treason or to alter its scope, and enshrines this in 
Article III, for the Judiciary to guard against encroachment of 
the protections provided for in the Treason Clause. 
Two centuries later, by combination of executive action, 
secret agency adjudication, and congressional authorization, a 
citizen may be executed for levying war against the United 
States with none of the constitutional protections afforded by 
the Treason Clause. The Judiciary has shielded challenges to 
this process as a nonjusticiable political question when the text 
of Article III demonstrably commits treason administration to 
 
 364 Shane, supra note 326. 
 365 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 58 (1981); United States v. O’Brien, 391 
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). 
 366 For a thorough discussion of targeted killing processes, see Geoffrey S. 
Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment, And a Proposed Quantum of Information 
Component: A Fourth Amendment Lesson in Contextual Reasonableness, 77 BROOK. L. 
REV. 437 (2012). 
 367 See supra note 326 (detailing the security threat of al-Aulaqi). 
 368 Vlasic, supra note 14, at 330 (citing Mazzetti et al., supra note 3); see supra 
note 14 and accompanying text. 
 369 It is a settled matter of constitutional law that only persons owing 
allegiance, like citizens, are covered by the Treason Clause. See supra note 125. 
Rhetorical point aside, it would also apply to persons such as legal resident aliens.  
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the Judiciary. Further, the Supreme Court has not corrected its 
Quirin problem, which has resulted in questionable conclusions 
by the Circuits. For example, some Circuit courts have 
interpreted allegiance as essential to treason by levying war, but 
permitted those owing allegiance to be processed without 
Treason Clause protections. They have done so because the 
crimes charged, while substantively the same as treason by 
levying war, were indiscriminate with respect to allegiance. It 
seems as though courts have eschewed the reasoning that 
predicated the inclusion of the Treason Clause in the 
Constitution and ignored the maxim, “[w]hen anything is 
prohibited directly, it is also prohibited indirectly.”370 
As a policy matter, al-Aulaqi was driving in a car on a 
deserted highway at the time that he was executed. Not every 
U.S. citizen that preaches jihad is a military threat to the 
United States. Looking forward, how does one resolve this 
issue of whom the government may kill via a drone strike? 
The coordinate branches of government may resolve 
these issues by adopting the following suggestions. The Court 
may solve the Quirin problem in the Circuits by adopting the 
readings of Bollman, Wiltberger, Quirin, and Cramer proposed 
in this note. As to the policy question, this note supports the 
proposal that the CIA is allowed to carry out its macabre task, 
but not unilaterally. The issue is not with these operations 
being carried out, but with who orders them to be carried out. 
Some court must approve petitions for kill warrants of U.S. 
citizens. The Judiciary must satisfy its Article III obligations, 
such as the requirement of two witnesses to the same overt act, 
instead of delegating them to another branch’s agencies. 
Exercising its Article III power over the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, Congress may pass a statute that creates a 
judicial process where secret, ex parte review is given to 
wartime kill order cases like that of al-Aulaqui. Thus, the 
Government may be able to maintain secrecy where necessary 
and the Judiciary may discharge its Article III obligations 
before action is taken against a citizen. 
If nothing else, the Treason Clause—and its specific 
allocation of the responsibility for resolving treason cases to 
every branch other than the Executive—means that the 
President, and those who serve at his pleasure, should not act 
as prosecutor, defense counsel, judge, jury, and executioner, 
 
 370 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1863 (9th ed. 2009) (“[Q]uando aliquid 
prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum.”). 
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especially in secret. There needs to be some action to curtail the 
incipient erosion of Treason Clause protections, lest the United 
States revert to the state of treason law in England before the 
Statute of Edward III: the assignment of unreviewable death 
sentences by unilateral executive whim. 
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